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The debate among practicing lawyers and legislators about products li? 
ability reform1 has failed to consider much of the recent scholarship in the 
law and economics of contracts and torts.2 In light of these literatures, 
1. The results of this debate are reflected in actual and proposed legislative interventions that 
overturn various products liability rules. For example, bills have been introduced in past sessions of 
Congress to create a national products liability law. See, e.g., S. 44, 98th Cong., lst Sess., reprinted in 
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 1140-48 (5th ed. 1984). Also, many states have set 
caps on or eliminated recovery for various elements of the typical tort judgment, such as pain and 
suffering. See, e.g., Act of July 24, 1986, 2 CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. 11 91,230 (to be codified at Haw. 
Rev. Stat. ? 663) (limiting pain and suffering awards in certain tort actions to $375,000); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. ? 549.23 (West Supp. 1987) (limiting awards for intangible losses to $400,000). 
2. The recent economic tort literature is too voluminous to permit full citation here. An excellent 
summary with many references and much of the author's original work is S. Shavell, An Eco? 
nomic Analysis of Accident Law (1987). Also helpful is W. Landes & R. Posner, The Eco? 
nomic Structure of Tort Law (1987). Thorough descriptions of current doctrine are found in J. 
Henderson & A. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process (1987) and M. 
Shapo, The Law of Products Liability (1987). The work of Robert Cooter, Richard Epstein, 
George Priest and Gary Schwartz has been more influential in the theoretical literature than the 
references made later herein suggest. 
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some seriously discussed reform proposals, such as a renewed commitment 
to the "fault principle," seem unhelpful;8 other apparently promising 
ideas do not appear on policymakers' agendas. This Article proposes solu? 
tions to products liability problems that integrate and apply the insights of 
the contracts and torts theorists. It evaluates both current law and these 
solutions under the dominant norm in the contracts literature: consumer 
sovereignty. This norm holds that the law should reflect the preferences of 
competent, informed consumers regarding risk allocation. 
Section I first articulates the justifications for choosing products liability 
rules according to the consumer sovereignty norm. The Section then iden- 
tifies the "optimal contract"?the contract that informed, competent con? 
sumers would prefer?for allocating product related risks. Section I con? 
cludes with the claim that this contract should govern products liability 
disputes?should be the law?unless the particular agreement at bar dis- 
places it. 
Section II begins by showing that the rules that constitute current strict 
liability doctrine diverge in two ways from the optimal contract that the 
consumer sovereignty norm implies. First, the substantive provisions of the 
legal rules differ from those of the optimal contract, in particular by im? 
posing greater risks on firms than that contract would provide. Second, 
private parties are prevented from varying the legal rules by agreement. 
The putative consumer sovereignty justification for the disjunction be? 
tween current law and the optimal contract rests on two factual premises. 
Initially, competent, informed consumers, courts incorrectly suppose, 
would choose sales contracts that require firms to pay compensation for 
all losses attributable to defective products as well as induce firms to in? 
vest optimally in safety. Further, market failure prevents unregulated 
markets from supplying these contracts. Market failure occurs first be? 
cause consumers cannot understand contracts very well, thereby permit? 
ting firms to use contracts that result in consumers receiving less compen? 
sation and less safety than the consumers truly want. In addition, 
consumers systematically underestimate the likelihood and seriousness of 
the harms that products can cause. These errors ensure that consumer 
contracts would be unsatisfactory even if the state required them to be 
readable; consumers would mistakenly, though voluntarily, agree to insuf? 
ficient protections. Section II-B argues that the evidence in support of 
market failure is too weak to support the contract-proscribing aspect of 
strict liability. Rather, markets should be permitted to generate the terms 
under which consumers purchase. This conclusion implies first that courts 
should enforce exculpatory clauses and contractual specifications of the 
3. This suggestion has been made in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy 
Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis 
in Insurance Availability and Affordability 61-62 (1986). 
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seller's quality obligation, and second that when the parties' agreement is 
silent, courts should fill in the gaps with the appropriately derived optimal 
contract. Section II-C concludes this Article's discussion of current law by 
showing that a principal judicial response to perceived market failure, the 
use of design defect tests to regulate product quality directly, is unsatisfac? 
tory were market failure in fact to exist. 
Section III follows the path begun in Section II-C. That is, Section III 
supposes both that consumer sovereignty should be the governing norm 
and that market failure prevents firms and consumers from implementing 
this norm by contract. The latter assumption is made not to undercut the 
principal argument in Section II, but rather because a complete reversion 
to a regime of freedom of contract for product-related risks may be a re? 
form that history has foreclosed. If so, the task is to identify the policy 
responses to market failure that the consumer sovereignty norm best im? 
plies. Section III suggests three such reforms. First, courts' unsuccessful 
efforts to specify the safety levels that products must meet should be aban? 
doned in favor of holding firms liable whenever their products cause 
harm. Second, courts should reinstate a contributory negligence defense. If 
firms are strictly liable unless consumers are contributorily negligent, 
products are likely to be optimally safe. If consumers' responsibility for 
safety is reduced below the level that a contributory negligence defense 
requires, the strict liability solution will cause firms to invest excessively 
in safety. The imperfect information rationale for today's strict liability 
assumes that consumers cannot make rational investments in safety. This 
assumption is incorrect; consumers need to know fewer and simpler things 
to behave carefully than they need to know to choose among contract 
clauses allocating product risks. It is therefore a mistake to relax consum? 
ers' obligation to take care. 
Third, the standard-form contract imposed by law should allocate the 
risk that consumers will incur pecuniary harm to firms, but it should 
leave the risk that consumers will incur nonpecuniary harm on consumers; 
tort recoveries for pain and suffering and the like should be abolished. 
Well-informed consumers probably would contract for this risk allocation, 
so the law, following the dictates of consumer sovereignty, should provide 
it. 
This Article is written in an exploratory spirit. Modern products liabil? 
ity law is less than three decades old. Understanding it requires answers 
to difficult questions about how markets allocate defect risks and how con? 
sumers respond to these risks. The economic and psychological theories 
required to answer many of these questions are primitive, and the empiri? 
cal record presupposed by the theories ranges from scanty to nonexistent. 
When there is so much ignorance on fundamental matters, the law should 
assume a passive role. History has foreclosed this option, however: The 
state, largely through its courts, now regulates products extensively. The 
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goals of this Article are influenced by the fact that the legal structure rests 
on generally unproven positivist premises. The Article aims to clarify the 
issues on which law reform should turn, to exhibit the social science rele? 
vant to these issues, and to make the best grounded recommendations for 
reform that this record permits.4 
I. The Consumer Sovereignty Norm 
in Products Liability Law 
A. An Analysis of Consumer Sovereignty and Its Competitors* 
The consumer sovereignty norm may govern cases of both actual and 
hypothetical consent. In the former case, well-informed, uncoerced con? 
sumers actually consent to particular contract clauses. The consumer sov? 
ereignty norm uncontroversially supports enforcement of these clauses; the 
various moral theories to which Americans adhere respect truly consen? 
sual arrangements. In the latter case, affected consumers do not actually 
consent to the contract clauses for which enforcement is sought. Consent 
could be lacking because consumers are unaware of the clauses or their 
effects, or because the clauses are required by the state. In this second 
case, consumer sovereignty holds that courts should enforce only contract 
clauses to which well-informed, uncoerced consumers would have as- 
sented: when actual assent is lacking, courts should enforce clauses to 
which hypothetical consent is given. These clauses can be of two types: 
default rules, which apply when the contract at bar is silent, and required 
clauses, which courts impose on all contracting parties. 
Consumer sovereignty also is an attractive norm when consent is hypo? 
thetical. Initially, giving hypothetical consent the force of real consent is 
justifiable on utilitarian grounds when the contract clauses that courts 
adopt as default rules or rules of law would maximize the utility of af? 
fected persons. Clauses achieving this result are identified first by suppos- 
ing that persons prefer contracts that maximize their expected utility, and 
then by deriving the terms that this preference best implies. Section I-B 
employs this "consumer sovereignty method" to choose the optimal con? 
tract for product-related harms. A contract so derived may be thought to 
4. This Article considers reforms that are broadly consistent with private law solutions to the 
defective products problem. For example, reforms such as required disclosure are analyzed, but pro? 
posals for significant institutional change, such as completely transferring products liability cases to an 
administrative forum, are not. The analysis below applies only to products liability issues concerning 
contracting parties, and not to tort law in general. This is because consumer sovereignty is most 
plausible as a governing norm in market contexts, where consumer choice can directly influence firm 
behavior. Finally, the Article omits consideration of causation issues, which would require a very 
lengthy analysis. An illuminating and thorough discussion of causation issues may be found in Sympo? 
sium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 397 (1987). This author's views are 
briefly expressed in Schwartz, Causation In Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, id. at 639. 
5. Moral theories of tort are helpfully summarized in Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their 
Scope and Limits (pts. I & II), 1 Law & Phil. 371 (1982), 2 Law & Phil. 5 (1983). 
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maximize utility tautologically, but this view is false. Uninformed persons 
may like the contracts they have and dislike new, "efficient" contracts that 
the state supplies or requires; as long as their ignorance is not dispelled, 
such preferences are possible.6 Such preferences do seem unusual, how? 
ever, because inefficient contracts make people worse off than do efficient 
contracts; hence, people generally will prefer efficient contracts to govern 
their commercial lives, in which cost is an important consideration. Con? 
tract clauses that rest on hypothetical consent?that are derived by the 
consumer sovereignty method?thus are justifiable on utilitarian grounds. 
The contract clauses that this method implies also seem justifiable on 
autonomy grounds. This conclusion may seem surprising because appeals 
to autonomy as a justification for rules become less persuasive as the con? 
sent to those rules becomes more hypothetical, and the rules the consumer 
sovereignty method selects are derived from the preferences of a utility 
maximizing "machine," not the desires of actual human beings. It is plau? 
sible to suppose, however, that real people do want to minimize the 
amount of risk to which they are exposed, but not to spend excessively on 
risk reduction. The consumer sovereignty method is a helpful heuristic to 
make the implications of this tradeoff precise. Consumer sovereignty rules 
also in practice are unlikely seriously to contravene actual assent because 
they are revokable. Firms can maximize profits by supplying consumers 
with contracts that differ from those which courts chose on the basis of 
incorrect assumptions about the preferences of actual people. Markets 
thus permit consumers in effect to revoke consent when decisionmakers 
mistakenly attribute it to them. 
It is becoming customary, in philosophical circles, to identify autonomy- 
based rules not by stressing similarities between actual assent and utility 
maximizing choice, but by asking what rules persons would agree to were 
they made to choose in a situation stripped of morally irrelevant features. 
This is the method of "contractualism" as articulated by Rawls7 and more 
recently by Scanlon.8 Its object is to induce people to take an impartial 
point of view?to take others' interests into account as well as their own 
6. Bernard Williams argues that when government creates the state of affairs that would have 
obtained had people acted on their idealized?that is, informed?preferences, "it is possible that" 
utility will actually be reduced because people "may never lose their errors and, if they do not, will 
never actually have the idealized preference the policy is designed to satisfy." B. Williams, Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy 88 (1985). Another possible difficulty is that reforms may not be 
adopted because people with mistaken views believe the reforms are not cost-justified and so prefer 
legislators not to adopt them. See Pauly, Kunreuther & Vaupel, Public Protection Against Mis- 
perceived Risks: Insights From Positive Political Economy, 43 Pub. Choice 45 (1984) (citizens often 
underestimate risks and misperceive impact of alternative ways of minimizing risks). The large 
amount of consumer protection legislation now in place suggests that this difficulty may not be 
serious. 
7. See, e.g., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11-12 (1971). Rawlsian and utilitarian original 
position analysis is illuminatingly discussed in D. Mueller, Public Choice 227-57 (1979). 
8. See Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 103 (A. 
Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982). 
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when choosing legal rules. According to Rawls, whose approach is 
adopted here, impartiality is achieved by keeping the "rule choosers" ig- 
norant of features of themselves or actual cases that would permit the 
choosers to advance their self interest at others' expense. Here, the task is 
to choose a "meta rule" for deriving products liability rules?an organiz- 
ing principle for finding the terms of the governing standard contract. The 
persons who are to select this meta rule should be ignorant of their own 
wealth and the probability that they will be injured. Knowledge of these 
features could skew choice: Rich people could more easily absorb losses 
and thus may want laws that impose relatively high risks on consumers; 
persons highly likely to be injured may opt for generous compensation. 
On the other hand, because persons would not be choosing rules that will 
govern society's basic structure, such as a constitution, but rather a rule of 
decision that presupposes the existence of a basic structure, it is appropri? 
ate to allow them to know something about this basic structure. For ex? 
ample, people choosing a meta rule for torts should know that states pro? 
vide workers' compensation and disability insurance, because they might 
prefer not to adopt a tort solution that would duplicate payment systems 
now in place. 
Given this context, there are two candidates for the meta rule that 
should determine products liability law: maximin and utility maximiza? 
tion. The former directs persons to secure the best possible outcome in the 
worst state that could occur.9 People in the present version of an "original 
position" would realize that the worst state is to be injured and poor. To 
choose maximin would imply that the law should provide complete com? 
pensation in all possible future states, so as to include this worst state. 
Maximin is attractive to the very risk averse because its criterion makes 
only the worst conceivable social states relevant to the choice of rules. Less 
risk-averse persons would reject maximin because it can lead to quite 
costly laws. For example, as will be shown in Section I-B-l, a full com? 
pensation rule would be likely to force even normally risk-averse persons 
to purchase excessive insurance. 
People who are being asked to choose a meta rule for products liability 
law, rather than settling on a basic social structure, would probably reject 
maximin in favor of utility maximization. They would know that the 
worst outcome?incurring serious, completely uncompensated injury?is 
substantially mitigated by existing social safety nets. Hence, the strongest 
motivation for choosing maximin is absent. The costs of maximin, such as 
having to make excessive insurance payments in the form of high prices, 
also bear most harshly on the poor, who by definition have the least dis- 
posable income. Thus, maximin is not especially desirable even though 
one may turn out to be poor. Further, the utility maximization criterion 
9. See J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 151-53. 
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does take ordinary risk aversion into account and implies the least costly 
rules.10 Consequently, people choosing in the circumstances presented 
here would prefer the utility maximization meta rule, the rule that the 
consumer sovereignty norm suggests. The rules derived by use of the con? 
sumer sovereignty method thus seem justifiable from an impartial point of 
view. It again appears that courts could use this method to establish de? 
fault rules or the content of a strict liability doctrine. 
A competing conception of tort law holds that the state should pursue 
corrective justice. According to this conception, victims should be permit? 
ted to sue those who have caused harm, unless defendants' actions were, in 
some morally relevant sense, privileged or otherwise justifiable.11 Like the 
consumer sovereignty norm, the corrective justice theory favors enforce? 
ment when uncoerced, well-informed persons actually consent, before any 
injury occurs, to a contract that imposes substantial risks on them. The 
central premise of corrective justice is that it is unjust to deprive someone 
of property or personal integrity against that person's will. This premise 
supports permitting persons to waive their right to compensation?to 
agree to bear risks?in appropriate circumstances. 
In the absence of actual consent, the question is whether corrective jus? 
tice theory implies different legal rules than the hypothetical consent rules 
supported by the consumer sovereignty norm. Corrective justice theorists 
seem to have devoted little attention to this issue. The common corrective 
justice paradigms involve cases in which the parties do not bar? 
gain?where no markets exist. Corrective justice and consumer sover? 
eignty seem consistent in bargaining situations because the consumer sov? 
ereignty norm seeks to replicate the choices of the same persons whose full 
integrity and autonomy corrective justice theorists want to protect. Hence, 
the conclusions this Article reaches with respect to products liability law, 
which governs relations between parties interacting in markets, should be 
taken as consistent with corrective justice views of tort law, at least until 
those views are given further expression.12 
10. See infra Section I-B. 
11. See, e.g., Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. 
Legal Stud. 49 (1979); Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & Phil. 37 
(1983). 
12. The analysis above presupposes the validity of methodological individualism?deriving legal 
rules from the constructive choices of autonomous self-interested persons. A competing methodological 
conception holds that people are socially constituted beings, and that legal rules necessarily reflect and 
should reinforce their social nature. On this view, it would seem questionable?perhaps circular?to 
assess present or proposed legal rules by people's actual or "reconstructed" preferences because those 
preferences themselves are a product of the legal culture. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Pri? 
vate Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1145-58 (1986). This seems to imply, not that legal rules 
should be independent of the citizenry's wants, but that they should be chosen to encourage the forma? 
tion of better preferences. 
This method of analysis is not pursued here for two reasons. First, it is difficult to know what 
"better" means in the context of product liability problems. The rules favored in this Article are either 
implied by, or are consistent with, utilitarian and neo-Kantian notions of efficiency and autonomy. To 
utilitarians or neo-Kantians, that such legal rules would create or reinforce people's preferences for 
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B. The Optimal Contract 
The consumer sovereignty norm can be implemented in products liabil? 
ity law in either of two related ways. First, the law can create the appro? 
priate "default rule." A default rule is applied when the parties' contract 
is silent, and resolves disputes according to the contract that most well- 
informed persons would have adopted if they were to bargain about the 
matter. Since people are assumed in the theoretical literature to want to 
maximize utility, the default rule is derived by asking what contract 
clauses are utility maximizing. Second, the default rule can be hardened 
into a set of prescriptions that courts apply to resolve disputes without 
reference to the contract signed by the parties before them. The prescrip? 
tions are coercive in only a weak sense, however, since they reflect what 
informed people would prefer. The distinction between default rules and 
prescriptions implies that although an optimal contract can be constructed 
by determining what informed parties would have consented to, it is a 
separate question whether there should be freedom of contract (a default 
system) or strict liability (prescription). This Section follows this distinc? 
tion by first identifying the optimal contract in general for defect risks. 
Since a well-informed consumer is interested in being compensated for 
harm and minimizing the amount of harm to which he is exposed, the 
"optimal" contract for such a consumer would: (1) compensate him for 
pecuniary harm, (2) probably not compensate him for nonpecuniary 
harm, and (3) induce the manufacturer to reduce the risk of harm when 
the steps the manufacturer could take to do so cost less than the reduction 
in risk these steps would avoid. Section I-B-2 then asks whether this opti? 
mal contract should be the default rule or should be made mandatory. 
these rules and their associated policies is innocuous. A commitment to other moral theories might 
imply different legal rules that would create different preferences, but no such moral theories seem 
widely acceptable or attractive enough in the product liability context to pursue seriously. 
Second, current theories about the relation between culture and preference formation suggest that 
culturally influenced preferences rest on a strong individualist base. See generally Wildavsky, Choos? 
ing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 3 (1987). According to these theories, people have a few "master preferences" respect- 
ing what sorts of persons they are and, relatedly, what groups they want to identify with or join. 
People then deduce their views on concrete issues from the clues that group membership provides. For 
example, the relevant question for person A, a liberal, may not be what he thinks about foreign trade 
but what liberals like him think about it. It is difficult to apply this theory of preference formation, 
tentative as it is, to issues as detailed as whether courts should choose assumption of risk or contribu? 
tory negligence as tort defenses. The best that apparently can be done is this: People across most of 
the political spectrum have a master preference for a market economy (on a high level of abstraction) 
because this economy provides many goods and services at less than prohibitive cost and with rela? 
tively little state coercion. The consumer sovereignty norm, as discussed above, is a useful heuristic for 
deriving preferences over concrete issues from this privately originated master preference. Hence, rules 
chosen according to this norm are not circular but rather reflect people's real wants, except when a 
rule so derived conflicts with rules derived from another master preference. Since such conflicts seem 
rare in commercial areas, consumer sovereignty should generally govern the choice of products liabil? 
ity rules. The optimal contract to be developed in Section I-B thus can justifiably be society's default 
rule or the law. 
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1. The Insurance Decision13 
A firm that compensates consumers for the harms its product causes 
will reflect the expected compensation cost in the purchase price. An ele? 
ment of the price thus is an insurance premium, whose size ideally varies 
with the amount of "coverage" against loss that consumers demand. The 
provisions of the optimal contract respecting defect risks therefore will re? 
flect the amount of insurance against these risks that consumers prefer. It 
is customary to identify this amount on the basis of three principal as? 
sumptions. First, a consumer will choose an insurance contract that maxi- 
mizes his expected utility. Second, consumers' utility functions are "state 
dependent": They depend on the state of affairs arising after purchase of 
the product. The consumer's utility is lower in the state of the world in 
which the product is defective than in the state of the world in which it 
works perfectly. Third, firms offer insurance at actuarially fair prices; the 
amount of their premium equals the expected value of the risk against 
which the person insures.14 
Given these assumptions, a consumer's goal is to equalize the marginal 
utility of money to him in both states of the world he may face. The 
marginal utility of money is the rate at which the consumer's satisfaction 
from wealth changes with changes in the amount of wealth he holds.16 
The amount of satisfaction a dollar yields is a function of the importance 
of the needs it satisfies: A dollar that helps buy a meal for a poor and 
hungry person yields greater satisfaction than a dollar that would help the 
same person buy a yacht if he were rich. Since the satisfaction dollars 
bring changes with the significance of the needs dollars meet, the marginal 
utility of money varies with income. 
To see why consumers who maximize expected utility will attempt to 
equalize the marginal utility of money in all possible states of the world, 
let the expected marginal utility of money be higher in possible state of 
the world A than in possible state of the world B because the consumer 
has a lower income or greater demands on his income in the former state. 
Then the consumer would want to shift marginal dollars from state B to 
13. This Section applies theories principally developed in Graham & Peirce, Contingent Damages 
for Products Liability, 13 J. Legal Stud. 441 (1984); Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of 
Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982) [hereinafter Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss]; Cook & Graham, 
The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. Econ. 
143 (1977); see also Rea, Contingent Damages, Negligence, and Absolute Liability: A Comment on 
Graham and Peirce, 13 J. Legal Stud. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Rea, Contingent Damages]; 
Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government In Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. Legal 
Stud. 517 (1984). 
14. Because consumers dislike risk, they will pay a "risk premium" to avoid it. Thus, a competi? 
tive insurance price is equal to the risk value plus premium. See Schlesinger & Venezian, Insurance 
Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity: Profits, Market Structure and Consumer Welfare, 17 Rand 
J. Econ. 227 (1986). The analysis is unaffected by ignoring risk premiums. 
15. To use an archaic illustration, suppose that a person receives sixteen utils of satisfaction from 
ten dollars and twenty one utils of satisfaction from eleven dollars. In this case, the marginal utility of 
money?the utility an additional dollar yields?is five utils. 
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state A, in which the addition of new dollars will yield greater satisfaction 
than the satisfaction lost in state B. Utility is maximized when no further 
shifts of wealth between possible social states would increase utility; this 
outcome is reached when marginal utilities are equal in all possible states. 
Consumers equalize expected marginal utilities by purchasing insur? 
ance. For example, an accident may increase a person's marginal utility of 
money by creating a need for medical care. A seriously injured person is 
likely to use marginal dollars to satisfy more important needs, such as for 
medical services, than he would have satisfied with such dollars if no acci? 
dent had occurred. If an accident would increase the marginal utility of 
money in this way, the competent, informed consumer would insure 
against it by buying a contract requiring a firm to provide him with extra 
dollars if he is hurt. Insurance thus shifts wealth from the state of the 
world in which the marginal utility for money is relatively low?the state 
in which no injury occurs?to the state in which it is relatively high?the 
state in which an injury happens. This analysis predicts, therefore, that 
consumers will insure against those risks whose materialization would in? 
crease their marginal utility for money. Identifying these risks can be a 
difficult empirical inquiry, but some aspects of the question seem obvious. 
Certain forms of loss have two significant properties: They increase the 
marginal utility of money, and they are replaceable, dollar for dollar, by 
insurance. An accident that causes a consumer to lose wages creates such a 
loss. The consumer's marginal utility for wealth is higher in the state in 
which such an accident occurs than in the state in which it does not be? 
cause the consumer has less wealth in the former state than in the latter 
and so will use marginal dollars to satisfy more urgent needs, such as for 
shelter or medicine. Further, since the accident causes only a monetary 
loss, it is fully replaceable by insurance. In consequence, the consumer 
could equalize his marginal utility for wealth across states of the world by 
purchasing full insurance against losses?for example, of wages?that 
both increase the consumer's marginal utility of money and can be com? 
pletely erased by monetary payments. Losses with these two properties 
constitute what lawyers call "pecuniary" loss or harm; insurance theory 
thus predicts the existence of substantial private insurance against pecuni? 
ary loss. The wide use of major medical and disability insurance is consis? 
tent with this prediction.16 Therefore, the default rule should require 
firms to compensate consumers fully for pecuniary loss. 
16. See Abraham, The Cost of Attitudes, 95 Yale L.J. 1043, 1049-50 n.16 (1986) (summarizing 
studies on private insurance). Complete insurance against pecuniary harm is seldom bought due to the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. Con? 
sumers' desire for such coverage underlies the large amount of private insurance that people do have, 
however. Workers' compensation provides similar substantial coverage, replacing 86% of lost income 
during the first year of disability. Research Brief No. 12, Workers Compensation Research 
Institute, Income Replacement for Long-Term Disability 2 (1986). This percentage fails in 
subsequent years because of inflation, but transfer payments to injured workers are supplemented by 
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A more difficult question is whether, and to what extent, consumers 
would insure against other forms of loss. It sometimes is difficult to know 
whether accidents will increase or reduce a person's marginal utility for 
money. Consider a business executive who runs recreationally and who 
loses a foot in an accident. Suppose that she insured fully against her 
"replaceable" losses, such as medical expenses and temporary lost wages. 
Apart from these losses, the injury could increase the marginal utility of 
money for this consumer if it caused her to substitute travel or the sym- 
phony for running because these activities are more expensive. Her margi? 
nal utility could fall, however, if she substitutes reading for running. In 
the latter case, the consumer not only would want no insurance, but 
would prefer to shift dollars from the injury to the noninjury state?the 
reverse of the cases above?by betting against the accident happening. It is 
therefore difficult to say, as a general proposition, that people will insure 
against events that would only induce them to substitute other activities 
for those activities that accidents preclude. 
This discussion implies that consumers will not insure against harms 
that reduce, or do not affect, the marginal utility of money. This implica- 
tion has considerable normative significance because some theorists claim 
that pain and suffering and emotional distress exemplify such harms.17 
Consider an accident that causes no financial loss but is very painful for 
two weeks, or an accident that kills a person's relative. Theory holds that 
a consumer will insure against such losses only if they would increase the 
consumer's marginal utility for money. This could occur, for example, if 
persons who expect to be in pain would want to put themselves in the 
position where they could eat caviar or wear mink as compensations. But 
whether people actually want the ability to console themselves in these 
ways, and so will buy insurance to permit such consolations, or whether 
people would choose just to suffer is an empirical issue. In the wrongful 
death context, the appropriate resolution of this issue is obvious. The mo? 
tive for insuring is to be able to purchase substitutes in the state of the 
world in which one is injured, and this motive vanishes when it would be 
impossible to make such purchases. A person obviously could not buy sub? 
stitutes were her suffering to culminate in death. Hence, the current prac? 
tice of awarding pain and suffering damages in survival actions, as recom- 
pense for the suffering the victim experienced before death, is incorrect if 
the legal award is meant to provide the insurance coverage people would 
have been willing to buy before the accident. When the injured person 
survives, the pain and suffering issue is more difficult to resolve. 
Commentators sometimes claim that people prefer not to insure against 
social security disability insurance. See id. 
17. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 13, at 521; Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss, supra note 13, at 47-50; 
Rea, Contingent Damages, supra note 13. 
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"mental" losses because they almost never do insure against them.18 This 
evidence is inconclusive, however, because supply-side difficulties may 
prevent firms from offering "mental loss" coverage. In particular, adverse 
selection problems could be very significant in the sale of insurance 
against mental harms. The intensity of pain or distress at another's harm 
varies considerably across persons. Insurance companies cannot distin? 
guish among potential insureds by the insureds' capacities to suffer. 
Hence, the companies cannot charge higher premiums to persons who are 
more likely to experience mental pain and thus make claims. The 
penchant of consumers to "select adversely" against insurance compa? 
nies?to need and buy more insurance if they are likely to suffer 
more?can prevent the creation of insurance markets. Insurance compa? 
nies respond to their inability to distinguish among insureds on claim- 
related factors by charging such high rates to everyone that low-risk per? 
sons often refuse the coverage. It is difficult to sell insurance profitably 
when the pool of buyers is exclusively constituted of those who are high 
risks. Therefore, that consumers now do not buy pain and suffering insur? 
ance does not imply that they voluntarily eschew it. 
Some evidence suggests that people may want coverage against pure 
suffering. Consumers, for example, sometimes purchase accidental death 
and dismemberment insurance that protects against particular dramatic 
events whose occurrence is easy to verify, such as the loss of a leg.19 A 
partial motive for this insurance probably is to receive dollars that in some 
sense will ease the mental pain of these traumatic losses. On the other 
hand, the premium volume for this insurance is so small that the insur? 
ance cannot reflect a large pain and suffering component.20 And people do 
not routinely insure against the loss of children, even though such losses 
cause great emotional pain. It thus is difficult to infer whether people 
want insurance against pain and suffering losses from observing what they 
actually buy. 
In addition to these empirical uncertainties, other factors also argue 
against including insurance for pain and suffering in a compensation- 
based rule. Consumers would prefer less than full insurance against acci? 
dents that cause only mental pain, even when these accidents would in? 
crease the marginal utility of money, because of "income effects." Recall 
that such accidents increase the marginal utility of money only when vic- 
18. See Danzon, supra note 13, at 524 (that less than one percent of total contributions for health 
benefits are for insurance against accidental death and dismemberment indicates low willingness to 
insure against pain and suffering); Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 
Cal. L. Rev. 772, 785 (1985) (that no insurance company offers coverage for pain and suffering on 
first-party basis indicates insufficient demand for such coverage). 
19. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 13, at 524 (Fifty-seven percent of civilian work force carries 
accidental death and dismemberment insurance). 
20. Id. Uninsured motorists coverage does compensate for pain and suffering, but this coverage is 
probably designed to provide insureds with the damages they could collect, including a pain and 
suffering component, if their injurers had been insured. 
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tims will purchase expensive substitute activities to assuage the utility 
losses from suffering. Such substitutes are sought in the states of the world 
in which accidents happen. The demand for most goods and services has 
positive income elasticity; people increase their consumption as their in? 
comes rise. Because accidents make people poorer in a utility sense, people 
will purchase lesser amounts of substitute activities in "accident states" 
than they would have purchased if they had not been injured but instead 
had to give up goods that they then valued as much as they valued not 
suffering. Informed consumers will anticipate wanting lesser amounts of 
substitute activities in accident states than they would otherwise want, and 
so will make provision to buy less. In other words, consumers will not 
purchase full insurance.21 Therefore, the ideal legal rule regulating acci? 
dents causing mental losses that increase people's marginal utility for 
money would award victims partial damages. These damages would re? 
flect the partial insurance consumers would want ex ante.22 The level of 
partial insurance consumers would want varies among people, however, 
so the law's manageable choices are full insurance?overcom- 
pensation?or no insurance?undercompensation. The issue is on which 
side to err. The remaining factors that should influence courts in deciding 
what consumers want imply erring on the side of undercompensation. 
Intuition suggests that people would want to buy slight or no coverage 
against purely mental harms. As the runner illustration above showed, 
there is no good reason to suppose that, apart from causing pecuniary 
harm, accidents commonly increase persons' marginal utility for money. 
In addition, to buy mental loss coverage is, in effect, to sacrifice considera? 
ble present wealth in the form of insurance premiums to consume expen? 
sive vacations that will assuage whatever emotional distress accidents may 
cause. In the absence of evidence that spending money is a typical, or even 
common, response to grief and suffering, this motive for insurance seems 
unlikely. Finally, pain and suffering losses are difficult for firms to antici? 
pate and verify. The likely response of firms to these problems is to 
charge high prices for the coverage. These prices make pain and suffering 
insurance a bad buy for most people, whether it is sold by manufacturers 
or by insurance companies. These three factors together imply that the 
more purely mental the loss, the less likely a consumer will want to insure 
against it.28 
21. A technical version of this argument appears in Cook & Graham, supra note 13. 
22. An alternative measure of the appropriate damages level would be the amount people were 
willing to pay ex ante to reduce the probability of harm. See Rea, Contingent Damages, supra note 
13. However, as discussed in Section III-B-2, it is difficult to measure the willingness to pay to reduce 
the risk of nonpecuniary loss. 
23. Justice Traynor, a pioneer of strict liability, also argued in an early dissent against awarding 
pain and suffering damages in tort: 
Such [pain and suffering] damages originated under primitive law as a means of punishing 
wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had been wronged. They become increas? 
ingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly 
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To summarize, the optimal contract concerning product-related risks 
would pay firms to provide insurance against the core pecuniary losses 
that defective products could cause, such as lost wages, medical expenses, 
or property damage.24 It is unlikely, though not certain, that this contract 
would require any insurance against what now are sizable and common 
elements of the standard products liability judgment: pain and suffering 
and emotional distress. The appropriate default rule, then, probably 
should allocate the risk of incurring pecuniary harm to firms, and the risk 
of incurring nonpecuniary harm to consumers. The appropriate prescrip? 
tive rule under strict liability must be consistent with the default rule if 
the animating norm is consumer sovereignty. Hence, given current evi? 
dence, the aspect of strict liability that prohibits firms from shifting the 
risk of incurring nonpecuniary harm to consumers cannot be justified by 
reference to the goal of compensating consumers for harm. 
2. The Product Safety Decision 
The insurance analysis above asked how the optimal contract should 
allocate the risk that harm will result from a firm's breach of its obliga? 
tion to produce a safe product. The analysis here asks how an optimal 
contract would specify this safety obligation. It is helpful first to ask what 
an efficient safety obligation is. For convenience, suppose that consumers 
cannot affect safety but that firms can. Assume that if a certain accident 
were to occur, it would reduce consumer A's utility by an amount equal to 
the loss of $5,000. Consumer A would pay the firm up to $50 to reduce 
this accident's probability by one percent. An efficient contractual safety 
obligation, then, would induce the firm to make its product this much 
safer if the cost of doing so would be below $50, but not if it would cost 
more than this. An explicit contract clause therefore could require the 
firm to make "cost-justified reductions in the risk of harm." If these words 
were absent, the court should impose this obligation as the default rule. 
Informed parties would seldom choose such a rule explicitly and would 
often contract out of the rule if it were to apply in default. This is be? 
cause, as Section III-A will show, full application of this rule requires the 
court or jury to ask how much particular consumers would pay ex ante to 
reduce risks of harm by specific amounts, information which is extremely 
difficult to reconstruct ex post. Parties commonly respond to this difficulty 
by specifying the quality obligation. Contracts exclude implied warranties 
and then make express warranties or explicit promises.26 Such clauses are 
distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods .... 
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 
(1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
24. Any medical and other tangible costs associated with mental distress constitute compensable 
pecuniary harm under the rule argued for here. 
25. These clauses sometimes require particular inputs to safety, such as a set of roll bars for a 
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the equivalent of the generic risk-reduction clause derived above, because 
informed consumers will only pay for safety levels or features that cost 
less than the risk reductions that consumers regard as worthwhile, and 
firms will make only those safety investments whose costs can be recov- 
ered from the consumers. 
This analysis has several implications. First, the judicial role should be 
limited to enforcing the parties' contracts respecting product quality; there 
is little need to create default rules because contracts seldom are silent 
about quality. Second, courts should be reluctant to enforce contracts 
when consumers are uninformed; it is difficult to regard particular ex? 
press warranties or quality promises as reflecting optimal tradeoffs be? 
tween cost and risk reduction when consumers lack the data to assess 
risks. Third, significant difficulties arise if consumers actually are unin? 
formed. In this event, the consumer sovereignty norm directs courts to cre? 
ate and enforce the contracts that informed parties would make. As shown 
above, there are two possibilities. First, courts could devise a version of the 
generic risk-reduction rule, assessing a firm's safety performance against 
the criterion of consumers' willingness to pay for safety. This could be 
done by choosing rules for damages that would induce firms, when mak? 
ing products, to equate the marginal cost of investments in safety with the 
marginal willingness of consumers to pay for safety. Second, courts could 
specify the quality levels below which products cannot fall or the safety 
features products must contain. Courts in products liability cases often do 
the latter: Design defect litigation seeks to specify minimum quality levels 
and required safety features. Both this effort and the generic risk- 
reduction method seem undesirable policy responses, for they presuppose 
that courts and juries can assess consumer tradeoffs between safety and 
risks, and there is no reason to believe that courts possess this ability to 
any great degree. 
II. Strict Liability and Market Failure 
A. The Strict Liability Doctrine 
Strict liability is a judicially created doctrine that regulates the risk allo? 
cation aspects of transactions between manufacturers and consumers and 
between manufacturers and employees. Its rationale can be summarized 
by three propositions. First, the law should serve two functions: to create 
incentives for manufacturers to produce safe products and to ensure the 
provision of a peculiarly private form of social insurance, supplied by 
firms. Second, these two functions are complementary, not conflicting; 
both imply strict manufacturer liability. Third, private markets cannot 
tractor; specify performance standards, such as that materials can be fed at the rate of X feet per 
second but no more or that the machine must produce a certain amount of product a day; or specify a 
general quality level, such as that there are no defects in materials or workmanship. 
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provide appropriate safety incentives or sufficient insurance, largely be? 
cause the consumers and employees who operate in them are imperfectly 
informed. Hence, courts should impose the risks of product accidents so as 
best to serve the law's safety and insurance functions.26 
The strict liability doctrine has three distinct but related facets. First, it 
removes products liability cases from the law of sales. This result is 
achieved, in large part, by abolishing vertical and horizontal privity barri? 
ers so that any injured individual may sue the manufacturer directly.27 
This first facet of strict liability also prohibits firms from shifting product- 
related risks to consumers; instead, firms must compensate consumers for 
all harm to person or property that defective products cause.28 
Second, strict liability also regulates product quality. The reach of such 
regulation becomes clear when we consider the ways in which a product 
may be found defective. A product may have a "manufacturing defect" if 
it fails to comply with the maker's own standards, such as a car with 
wheels that lock. It may have a "design defect" if it meets the maker's 
standards but those standards are too low, such as a tractor without stabi- 
lizer bars. Finally, it may have a "warning defect" if the maker fails to 
inform the consumer of what constitutes safe use or fails to disclose hazard 
information; a drug sold without proper instructions or without a warning 
that persons with particular allergies should avoid it has such a defect. 
Liability for manufacturing defects is truly "strict" because a plaintiff 
need only show that a firm failed to comply with its own standard to 
prevail; there is no need to prove that the noncompliance arose through 
negligence. Liability for design and warning defects has significant negli? 
gence aspects, however, because the plaintiff must show that the defend? 
ant's conduct fell below a legally prescribed standard: A firm's design is 
defective only if the design generated costs net of benefits, and in most 
states its warning is defective only if the warning failed to reflect facts 
26. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which explic? 
itly held warranty disclaimers to be unenforceable as applied to personal injuries and added another 
basis for strict liability: that manufacturers often have monopoly power and exploit it by supplying 
contract clauses about liability that consumers do not want. Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87. Section II-B, 
infra, shows that firms with market power are unlikely to adopt "one-sided" contracts, but rather 
exploit their power by raising prices. The intellectual process that facilitated the widespread adoption 
of strict liability is thoughtfully described in Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical 
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985). 
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. ? 2-318B (1976). This Article does not discuss the horizontal privity doc? 
trine because it seems uncontroversially correct. Persons not in the chain of distribution, such as 
bystanders, must be allowed to sue firms that are in it, because otherwise these firms, not taking the 
bystanders' losses into account, will underinvest in safety. However, contributory negligence on the 
part of third-party victims should be a defense. See infra Section III-A. 
28. For example, Justice Traynor, in refusing to enforce an exculpatory clause, explained: 
Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact that it restricted its contractual liability 
to Vandermark is immaterial. Regardless of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject 
to strict liability in tort because it is in the business of selling automobiles, one of which proved 
to be defective and caused injury to human beings. 
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 
(1964). 
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about the product that the firm should have learned.29 True strict liability 
exists for design and warning defects only in the sense that firms cannot 
contract out of design and warning liability. 
Third, strict liability affects plaintiffs' conduct. Plaintiffs have less in? 
centive to take care under the strict liability rule than under the negli? 
gence regime that preceded it.30 Contributory negligence, under which the 
injurer is not held liable for accident costs if the victim has failed to take 
due care, is not a complete defense to an action in strict liability. In a 
significant minority of states, plaintiffs prevail unless they have assumed 
the risk.31 In the rest, the governing rule is comparative negligence, under 
which the injured and injuring parties are each assessed a fraction of the 
costs of the accident in proportion to their relative lack of due care.32 
The analysis in Section I-B showed that regulation according to the 
strict liability doctrine is problematic in two significant respects. First, the 
contract-proscribing aspects of strict liability drive a wedge between the 
law's compensation and safety goals. The compensation goal dictates that 
firms should be held strictly liable only for pecuniary harm, because this 
is all the insurance consumers probably want. The safety goal suggests 
that firms should be liable for more harm than this in order to create 
appropriate incentives for firms to invest in safety. If firms are liable for 
more harm, however, they will reflect this liability in their prices, and 
consumers will be forced to purchase excessive insurance. Second, the 
product regulation facet of strict liability?in particular, the design defect 
aspect?reflects judicial attempts to set quality standards, a task, it was 
suggested above, for which courts may be ill-suited. 
Section II-B argues that the evidence in support of market failure is too 
weak to justify the strict liability doctrine. If this view is accepted, courts 
should "regulate" products only by enforcing the contracts that markets 
supply and by supplementing these contracts with the default rules that 
Section I-B derived. If this view is rejected, the question becomes whether 
29. That strict liability as applied to design and warning defects is actually negligence seems to 
have first been pointed out clearly by Gary T. Schwartz. See G. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding 
Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435 (1979) [hereinafter Products Liability]; see also G. 
Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence And the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 923 (1981). 
Design and warning liability would be "strict," in the courts' view, if firms were held liable on the 
basis of knowledge about their products that was not reasonably obtainable at the time of sale but 
which came to light later. See, e.g, Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-95, 525 P.2d 
1033, 1037 (1974) (en banc) (noting that true strict liability for design defects would involve examin? 
ing only dangerousness of product and not surrounding circumstances and knowledge at time article 
was sold). Most jurisdictions assess product design by reference to what was technologically feasible 
when the product was sold. 
30. A further description of this feature of strict liability can be found in S. Shavell, supra note 
2, at 5-32. 
31. This is the Restatement rule. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 402A comment n 
(1965) (contributory negligence is not defense but assumption of risk is); see also McCown v. Interna? 
tional Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). 
32. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 
(1978). 
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judicial specification of the quality obligation and strict liability for all 
losses are the best regulatory responses. Section II-C, consistent with its 
purpose of evaluating current law, concludes by arguing that the courts' 
current efforts to regulate product quality directly are misguided. Section 
III, whose task is to identify reforms, considers substitutes for judicial 
quality regulation and then takes up the problems of harmonizing the 
law's safety and compensation goals in a world in which consumers are 
assumed to be imperfectly informed. 
B. Strict Liability as Justified by Imperfect Information 
Strict liability is justifiable if firms routinely use suboptimal contracts. 
It is commonly claimed that firms do just this because "bargaining power" 
is "unequal."33 This view reduces to the claim that firms exploit the exis? 
tence of structural market power or the claim that they exploit imperfect 
information. The first claim is difficult to credit given that "restrictive" 
warranty coverage seems uncorrelated with market power.34 The latter 
position is the subject of this and the next Section. To understand the 
pathology of imperfect information, it is helpful first to understand the 
anatomy of well-functioning markets. Suppose that many sellers and buy? 
ers for a particular product exist and the buyers want to insure with sell? 
ers against pecuniary loss. The competitive price for this insurance is $50 
(the failure probability times the expected loss equals $50). Let firm #1 
offer the product without insurance and firm #2 offer the product plus 
insurance costing $65. If firm #3 offers the product plus insurance costing 
$60, it will capture most of the buyers, except that firm #4 may then 
propose a sale with insurance costing $58. As a result of competition, all 
firms will be compelled to sell insurance at its competitive price of $50; 
the market will supply the optimal contract. On the other hand, let a 
particular consumer want a nonstandard contract, for example one that 
requires a large payment if the consumer incurs only pain and suffering. 
Since the costs to a firm of creating a special contract for one person will 
almost always exceed the gain to that person, and therefore the price he is 
willing to pay, this relatively unique consumer probably will be unable to 
purchase the insurance he wants. Firms commonly are responsive to the 
preferences of consumer groups, rather than the preferences of every 
33. The classic statement of this position is found in Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion?Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943); see also Whitford, Law and 
the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 1006. 
34. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297, 1320-25 
(1981). There also is little theoretical reason to believe that firms with structural market power will 
exploit consumers by supplying unwanted contracts rather than by raising prices. See infra text ac? 
companying notes 38-40. 
35. For further discussion of this point, see Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Un- 
conscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1064-66 (1977). 
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The consumer in the illustration actually is the victim of unequal bar? 
gaining power, but his plight seems not to call for a legal response. Some 
consumers probably want planes with couches and amphibious cars, and 
are the victims of unequal bargaining power in the sense that too few such 
consumers exist to make serving them in these ways profitable. But unless 
one believes that every commercial preference should be satisfied, regard? 
less of its cost, a market that satisfies the preferences of consumer groups 
seems good enough. As we have seen, group preferences for contracts will 
be satisfied in competitive markets. 
Markets may function less well than the example above implies because 
information in them is imperfect. The example rests on three information 
assumptions. First, consumers know what their contracts say. If a firm 
refuses to sell insurance?that is, disclaims?or sells it at a high price (the 
$65 above) consumers know this. Second, consumers will shop for con? 
tracts they like, and therefore will know what options markets offer. Con? 
sequently, if firm #1 refuses to sell insurance but firm #2 offers it at a 
good price, consumers who want insurance will buy from firm #2. Third, 
consumers perceive risks correctly and can appreciate the effect on risk of 
product alterations. If a consumer has a one percent chance of suffering 
$5,000 in pecuniary harm from an accident, the consumer knows he bears 
a risk of $50, and would pay $50 to a firm as an insurance premium. 
Further, if the consumer bears a risk of incurring pain and suffering, the 
consumer knows this too, and would be willing to pay a cost-justified sum 
to reduce this risk. When these three assumptions are satisfied, unregu- 
lated markets will supply optimal contracts. 
These three assumptions seldom seem satisfied in consumer markets. 
The important questions, then, are what happens when the assumptions 
are not satisfied and whether strict liability in tort is the best legal re? 
sponse. Respecting the first assumption, no market can work well when 
consumers do not know what their contracts say. The term most relevant 
to this discussion is the warranty, and the sparse empirical evidence sug? 
gests that consumers do know the warranty coverage that firms supply.36 
Further, the best response to the failure of consumers to read contracts is 
to make them readable. The Magnuson Moss Act and state and local 
plain language laws have made progress in this respect.37 It is unwise to 
respond to the "reading problem" by incurring the very large costs of the 
36. See, e.g., Darden & Rao, A Linear Covariant Model of Warranty Attitudes and Behaviors, 
16 J. Marketing Res. 466 (1979). This data is unsurprising. The cost to a consumer of understand? 
ing a contract clause that is used in only one transaction may exceed the gain, but consumers make 
many transactions. If a family of related clauses appears often, the cost of learning what effect the 
clauses have is likely to be less than the gain. Clauses that set forth the seller's obligation in the event 
of product default exemplify a frequently used family of contract clauses; their content and language 
is similar in sales of cars, refrigerators, stereos, and so forth. Thus it is worthwhile to consumers to 
learn what these clauses mean. 
37. Such laws are discussed in Ross, On Legalities and Linguistics: Plain Language Legislation, 
30 Buffalo L. Rev. 317 (1981). 
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tort system when the problem probably can be addressed with cheaper 
and less intrusive regulatory methods. 
The second information assumption, that consumers will "search" for 
desirable contract terms, also is unrealistic in its simple form, but its vio? 
lation seems not to justify a tort law response. Though the data show 
consumer search to be fairly extensive,38 especially for expensive items, 
shopping is costly. Also, shopping costs vary directly with the number of 
product "attributes," including contract clauses, that consumers inspect. 
Since complex products such as cars often have several attributes that con? 
sumers find salient, it seems sensibly cautious to suppose that consumers 
search too little to ensure that contract clauses perfectly reflect their pref? 
erences. Firms may exploit the power that a lack of shopping confers on 
them to raise prices above competitive levels.39 In the example above, if 
too few consumers comparison shop, firms may sell them insurance, but 
for $65 rather than the $50 competitive price. 
There seems little reason to believe that firms also exploit insufficient 
consumer shopping by "degrading" contract "quality"?by not selling in? 
surance at all. The question facing a firm is whether it will do bet? 
ter?that is, maximize profits?by selling the contract clauses consumers 
want at excessive prices, or by selling clauses that consumers do not want 
at excessive prices. If consumers have a noticeable preference for a partic? 
ular clause?in economic terms, have a significant willingness to 
pay?firms will do better, other things being equal, by satisfying this 
preference: the greater each consumer's willingness to pay, the fewer con? 
sumers each firm needs to recover costs and make profits. On the other 
hand, if the cost to a firm of supplying a particular clause is high in 
relation to consumers' willingness to pay for it, the clause may not be 
supplied. There is little reason to believe that cost considerations outweigh 
consumer preferences for standard insurance coverage against economic 
losses?after all, a great deal of this insurance is now sold. The same 
analysis also applies to clauses specifying quality obligations. Therefore, 
the likely response of firms to a lack of consumer shopping is to offer 
consumers the contract clauses they prefer, though at excessive prices.40 
To summarize, the rejection of freedom of contract that strict liability 
reflects is difficult to justify on the ground that imperfect information ex? 
ists, if imperfect information is taken to mean that consumers do not know 
38. See Westbrook & Fornell, Patterns of Information Source Usage Among Durable Gcods Buy? 
ers, 16 J. Marketing Res. 303 (1979). 
39. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples 
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983). 
40. See id. for a more full development of the analysis in this paragraph. Also, when consumers 
can identify product quality accurately, so that imperfect information consists only of insufficient con? 
sumer search, firms are likely to supply consumers with the qualities consumers noticeably prefer. See 
generally Schwartz & Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 251 
(1985). 
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what their contracts say or do not search sufficiently for the contract 
clauses they prefer. The contract language problem is best remedied by 
legislative or administrative actions to improve contract readability, not by 
episodic judicial bans of particularly hard-to-read language. The con? 
sumer search problem is irrelevant to products liability altogether, since 
firms commonly exploit the existence of high search costs through price, 
not through inefficient warranty clauses. Further, the appropriate state 
response to the existence of high search costs is to reduce them, which 
courts cannot do. Thus, strict liability does not appear necessary on the 
grounds that the first two information assumptions made above may not 
be satisfied. Strict liability may be justified, however, if the third assump? 
tion?that consumers know risks of harm?is false. 
1. The Assumption that Consumers Know Risks 
Individual consumers can seldom price risks precisely; thus, if taken 
literally, this third assumption would rarely be satisfied. However, some 
forms of misperception are harmful, while others are not. This Section 
focuses on a form of misperception that courts and commentators com? 
monly assume to cause harm: consumer optimism. Optimism refers to a 
consumer's belief that product-related risks are less serious than they 
really are. Optimistic consumers, it is thought, will demand less insurance 
and less safety than their better-informed selves would want.41 Such opti? 
mism is supposed to be common. This Section defines optimism, illustrates 
its effect on the decision to insure, considers the relation of optimism to 
the law's product safety goal, and analyzes the evidence as to whether 
consumers actually are optimistic. 
2. A Definition of Optimism 
The risk that a product will cause harm is the likelihood of a defect 
multiplied by the costs that the defect would create. Let p* equal the true 
probability of a defect and C* equal the true cost of a defect. Then the 
true expected value of the harm is R*=/?*C*. If R, p, and C are the 
consumers' subjective estimates of these parameters, then a consumer is 
"optimistic" if she believes that risks are lower than they actually 
are?that is, when for her R<R*. Consumer optimism thus could occur 
when: (1) p<p* and C<C*; or (2) OC* but p<p* by enough to domi? 
nate any overestimation of defect costs; or (3) p>p* but C<C* by 
enough to dominate any overestimation of loss probabilities. 
To discuss the possible effects of these forms of optimism, this Article 
makes four assumptions: (a) The probability and cost variables are not 
41. This view is summarized in G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 55-58 (1970); see also 
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 
561, 563 (1977). 
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necessarily correlated at the production stage; a firm can take actions that 
would reduce the likelihood of defects but not their costs when manifested, 
and can reduce the costs of defects but not their probability; (b) Consum? 
ers cannot influence either the likelihood or the severity of harm; (c) Con? 
sumers recognize changes in the relevant variables but may misassess the 
extent of these changes. For example, when a firm takes an action that 
will reduce the likelihood of harm, the consumer knows that she should 
change her estimate of /?, but her change in this estimate may exceed or 
fall short of the true reduction; (d) Consumer estimates of p and C may be 
uncorrelated. A consumer, for example, may believe the likelihood of de? 
fects to be lower than it is in fact but predict correctly the magnitude of 
harm should a defect arise. 
3. The Decision to Insure 
Consumers will underinsure if they underestimate the risk of harm. For 
example, let /?* 
= $50 and /? = $30. A consumer would insure against the 
"perceived risk" at a price of $30, but no one would sell insurance at this 
price. Hence, the consumer will be underinsured?he will agree to too 
narrow a warranty. Whether consumers routinely underestimate risk 
levels is a complex question because assumption (d) above, that consumer 
errors in probability and cost assessments can be uncorrelated, permits 
"cross effects." A cross effect occurs when the consumer makes offsetting 
mistakes in p and C. For example, a consumer believes that the 
probability of harm is lower than it is in fact?"such an accident never 
could happen to me"?but also believes that accident costs are higher than 
they really are?"If I do have such an accident, I'll surely be crippled for 
life." Assumption (d) also implies that consumers could overestimate 
probabilities but underestimate costs?"Everything I buy breaks, but with 
this product at least there is little danger of physical harm." Because pes- 
simistic mistakes?"everything happens to me"?could dominate optimis- 
tic mistakes?"at least I'll never get seriously injured"?it seems impossi? 
ble to say a priori that optimism in risk assessment is routine. 
Consequently, requiring firms to bear the risk that consumers will incur 
pecuniary harm, rather than making this risk allocation only the default 
rule, cannot be justified without evidence of the extent to which optimism 
respecting risk levels actually exists. This conclusion would have to be 
modified if economic or psychological theory excluded the possibility of 
cross effects or held that optimistic mistakes commonly dominate pessimis- 
tic ones, but no such theory exists. Also, the assumption that consumer 
mistakes about probabilities and costs can be in different directions seems 
intuitively plausible. Whether consumers are systematically optimistic 
thus seems to pose a factual, not a theoretical, question. 
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4. Imperfect Information and the Product Safety Goal 
Markets could produce insufficient safety for two information-related 
reasons. First, consumers may buy too many unsafe products. This is a 
"quantity effect." Second, each product that is purchased may be less safe 
than it should be. This is a "quality effect."42 Optimism of the kind just 
discussed could produce quantity effects. To see how, suppose that a firm 
has invested in accident reduction to the point where the cost of further 
investment would exceed the gain in increased safety. The firm's product 
is then optimally safe and poses a defect risk of /?*. If the firm disclaims 
liability and its customers perceive R<R*y customers will suppose the 
total cost of the product to them?price plus risk?to be lower than it is in 
fact. As a consequence, they will buy more of the product than their bet- 
ter-informed selves would want. There also will be too many accidents, 
since the number of accidents usually varies directly with the number of 
products purchased. However, for the reasons set out in the previous Sec? 
tion respecting the insurance decision, whether this quantity effect actu? 
ally occurs is a factual question: The conclusion that R<R* does not 
follow logically from the premise that consumers may underestimate the 
odds or costs of defects because cross effects are possible. 
Whether unwanted quality effects will occur turns not on whether con? 
sumers are optimistic as to the current level of risk, but on how consum? 
ers' risk perceptions alter when firms alter risk levels by making (or delet- 
ing) safety improvements.43 As will be seen, products could be less or 
more safe than informed consumers would want, even if consumers per? 
ceive current risk levels correctly. The effect of changes in risk levels on 
product safety will be illustrated by considering three cases and making 
two simplifying assumptions: (a) Consumers assess accident costs cor? 
rectly?they can value the loss of a finger?but consumers may misassess 
probabilities of harm; optimism manifests itself in underestimates of the 
odds that defects will occur; (b) A firm can make its product safer only by 
reducing the likelihood of defects, not their cost. The firm's problem is to 
choose between selling the product unchanged or reducing the odds that it 
will injure. 
In each of the following cases, suppose that consumers are optimistic as 
to the current risk level and firms then make a safety improvement. In the 
first case, consumers correctly perceive the effect of this change. Optimism 
respecting the risk level will then have no effect on product safety. Con? 
sumers who can correctly perceive changes in risks will buy any cost- 
justified change that the seller offers; optimal outcomes thus arise because 
consumers are perfectly informed. In the second case, consumers become 
42. This quantity/quality distinction was first noticed by Calabresi, see G. Calabresi, supra 
note 41, at 73, and systematically developed by later theorists. 
43. The following analysis derives from Spence, supra note 41. 
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more optimistic as the product becomes safer. For example, the product in 
the illustration poses a .1 probability of harm in its unmodified state, 
while consumers believe the probability is .08. A firm then reduces the 
probability of harm to .08, but consumers believe the probability has 
fallen to .05. If consumers react to safety improvements in this way, firms 
will overproduce safety: People who overestimate the benefits of improve? 
ments will pay for too many improvements. For people who believe it is 
better to have fewer accidents than many, this second case has two desira? 
ble features. First, although too many products are purchased, because 
consumers perceive R<R* at all levels of risk, these products are exces- 
sively safe, so one bad effect?too many sales?is at least partly offset by 
the less bad effect?too much safety. Further, though consumers underin- 
sure, because /?</?*, they buy excessively safe products; again, one bad 
effect works against the other. Matters are less clear from an efficiency 
viewpoint since the more errors there are, the further from the "Pareto 
frontier"44 society may be. 
In the third case, consumers become more pessimistic as the product 
becomes safer. This could occur if consumers inferred from the making of 
improvements that the product is dangerous. Suppose that in the example 
in the previous paragraph, the firm reduces the probability of harm from 
.1 to .08, but the consumer believes that the risk has been reduced from 
.08 only to .07; she is still optimistic, but by less than she previously was. 
Consumers who undervalue safety improvements?that is, who perceive 
risk reductions as being smaller than they are in fact?will underpay for 
safety, and firms will respond by underproducing it. Thus, if consumer 
optimism decreases as safety increases, not only will too many accident- 
causing products be purchased, but these products will be less safe than 
informed consumers would want. 
The same three results would occur if firms could reduce defect risks by 
reducing the costs rather than the odds that defects will occur and if con? 
sumers could correctly perceive the odds but may misperceive the effect of 
reductions in costs. If consumers correctly perceive the effect of a seller's 
reduction in defect costs, firms will optimally reduce them; if consumers 
overestimate the effect of cost reductions, firms will reduce accident costs 
by too much; and if consumers respond pessimistically to changes in a 
product's ability to harm, firms will make suboptimal reductions in this 
ability. 
When the assumption that consumers make only one mistake at a time 
is relaxed, matters become murkier. For example, in the second case 
above, consumers knew the costs of defects but overestimated the effect of 
44. The Pareto frontier, also known as the utility-possibility frontier, is the set of allocative out? 
comes that are efficient in the sense that no person can be made better off without hurting someone 
else. For a basic discussion of this concept, see P. Samuelson & W. Nordhaus, Economics 486-87 
(12th ed. 1985). 
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a firm's reduction in the probability of harm. Firms overproduced safety 
as a result. This outcome would often occur when consumers mistake the 
probability and cost variables simultaneously, but not always. When con? 
sumers greatly underestimate the costs that defects could cause, reductions 
in defect probabilities that do not affect consumers' cost perceptions may 
cause consumers to react pessimistically. This is because consumers who 
believe the risk is very small will think there is little room for improve? 
ment and so may undervalue improvements that the seller makes. If many 
consumers perceive risks in this way, firms will underproduce safety.45 On 
the other hand, if consumers overreact to safety improvements that reduce 
both the odds and the costs of defects, the optimism effect is exacerbated; 
more safety will be produced than in the second case above, in which 
safety already was excessive. Given the possibility of cross effects and the 
ability of firms to affect odds and costs together, it becomes very difficult 
to say as a theoretical matter just when consumer optimism respecting 
changes in either variable would result in too little safety. 
To summarize, if consumers systematically misassess risk levels or re? 
spond inappropriately to manufacturer-induced changes in these levels, 
consumer contracts respecting safety are unlikely to be optimal. The strict 
liability response to the existence of imperfect information then requires 
courts to devise efficient solutions to quality problems, but the attempt to 
do this may entail serious difficulties. Hence, it is important to ask just 
what the data about consumer risk perceptions actually show. 
5. The Data 
The data are best approached by considering five null hypotheses: (1) 
Consumers misperceive the true level of risk they face; (2) Consumers' 
risk perceptions change inappropriately when true risks change; (3) Con? 
sumers accurately perceive risk levels (the reverse of (1)); (4) Consumers 
accurately perceive changes in risk levels (the reverse of (2)); (5) Con- 
45. This conclusion may be put more formally. Suppose a safety improvement reduces the odds of 
a defect but not the cost, and let pl-p2=k>0, where k is the consumer's perception of the change in 
the likelihood of harm?from pl to p2?as the result of a firm's additional investment in safety. Let 
the true reduction in the likelihood of a defect be pl*-p2* = m>0. Then the perceived reduction in 
risk is AR=kC, where C is the consumer's estimate of the costs that defects can create. The true risk 
reduction is A/?*=mC*, where C* is the true defect cost. If consumers believe that safety improve? 
ments reduce the odds of defects by more than the true value?that is, consumers are optimists about 
changes in the odds?then k>m. For consumers to be optimistic about changes in the risk of default, 
they must perceive AR>AR*. If we substitute for R and rearrange terms, we see that consumers will 
respond optimistically to safety improvements when C>C**m/k. Supposing k>m, the quotient of the 
two is less than one. As a consequence: (a) If C>_C*, the inequality always is satisfied, so consumers 
respond optimistically to safety improvements; and (b) If C is small relative to C*, the inequality may 
not be satisfied; consumers could respond pessimistically to safety improvements. As stated above, the 
intuition behind the second result is that if consumers are very optimistic about defect costs, believing 
them to be much lower than they actually are, they will not think there is much room for improve? 
ment in the safety of the product and so will underestimate the effect of a reduction in the likelihood 
of harm. 
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sumer risk perceptions can be made acceptably accurate by disclosure. 
The discussion below focuses on hypotheses (1), (3), and (5), because ap? 
parently no evidence at all has been collected on hypotheses (2) and (4). 
This is troubling, for without such evidence conclusions as to the desira- 
bility of strict liability are inevitably suspect. 
The evidence fails to show that consumers misperceive risk levels to the 
extent that undesirable equilibria exist. Though one well-known study 
showed that farmers underinsured against flood damage,46 later studies 
drew opposite conclusions about whether people correctly perceive risks. 
In one study, housing prices correctly reflected earthquake risks, being 
appropriately lower when these risks rose.47 In another study, housing 
prices appropriately decreased with increases in the probability of de? 
fects.48 Recent survey data showed that consumers have a substantial will? 
ingness to pay to reduce the injury rate from common household products 
such as drain openers; this willingness implied that survey respondents 
valued a hand burn from a chemical drain opener at $120,000, for exam? 
ple.49 This figure seems excessive, and thus suggests either that persons 
overestimate the costs of harm or are very risk averse when the issue is 
personal injury. These explanations in turn imply that people will not be 
underinsured and will put strong pressure on firms to produce safe prod? 
ucts. Further, studies relating wages to risks of particular jobs show that 
workers appreciate risks to life and health and exact substantial wage pre? 
miums for bearing them; the greater the threat of injury and death from a 
job, the higher the wage demanded by workers.50 This evidence implies, 
perhaps faintly, that markets in accident risks work adequately. Finally, 
consumers routinely purchase extended warranty coverage when buying 
expensive items such as cars and computers. This practice suggests an 
awareness of risk and a proper response by markets to this awareness.51 
46. See H. Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons 235-37 
(1978) (summarizing study results). 
47. Brookshire, Thayer, Tschirhart & Schulze, A Test of the Expected Utility Model: Evidence 
From Earthquake Risks, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 369 (1985). 
48. See Weicher, The Market for Housing Quality, in Empirical Approaches to Consumer 
Protection Economics 39 (P. Ippolito & D. Scheffman eds. 1986). A consumer spends more time 
evaluating a house than a less expensive product, but this cannot distinguish the housing studies. The 
essence of the risk underestimation claim is that because consumers are optimistic, they either mis- 
process information about risk or will not invest time in learning about it. Hence, they should be as 
optimistic about housing quality as they are about product quality. 
49. W. Viscusi & W. Magat, Right To Know and Behavioral Responses to Hazard Warnings 11 
(Duke University Center for the Study of Business Regulation 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author). 
50. See, e.g., W. Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Work? 
place 103-06 (1983) (summarizing other studies respecting risks to life); Saffer, Wages and Hazard? 
ous Working Conditions, 18 Applied Econ. 819 (1986) (discussing risks to health). 
51. A possible counterexample is the substantial underutilization of automobile seat belts. See 
Arnould & Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure, 12 Bell J. Econ. 
27 (1981). Inferences from consumer nonuse are inconclusive, however. As one recent commentator 
observed, "discomfort costs, combined with time and inconvenience costs, can go a long way toward 
explaining much nonutilization." Warner, Public Policy and Automobile Occupant Restraint: An 
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In sum, evidence drawn from surveys and actual market behavior more 
strongly supports the view that consumers are informed than the view that 
they are ignorant. 
Commentators sometimes claim that the cognitive psychology literature, 
which shows that people in laboratory experiments make systematic errors 
when processing information,52 supports the claim that consumers behave 
optimistically in markets. The references to this literature seem over- 
drawn. If the psychologists had a general theory about how people make 
decisions, and the theory generated predictions about what people will do 
in various circumstances, their experiments could be regarded as testing 
these predictions. Then, if the predictions actually were confirmed in the 
laboratory, it would be plausible to claim that the theory's view of how 
people decide matters in real life is correct, at least until the facts prove it 
false. Psychologists lack such a theory, however. They have instead a large 
set of observations about how experimental subjects behave. The external 
validity of this data is now in controversy for two related reasons. First, 
decision strategies that are inappropriate to laboratory settings often could 
be appropriate in real life.53 Second, the tasks people are assigned in labo? 
ratories sometimes seem too artificial to support a strong inference that 
persons routinely misperform important tasks in their actual lives.54 Con? 
sequently, it seems premature to make this experimental data the factual 
premise of important legal rules. 
Further, the most relevant psychological claim and the data supporting 
it suggest that consumers are likely to be pessimists to the extent that they 
Economist's Perspective, 19 Accident Analysis & Prevention 39, 48 (1987). This paper reported 
that consumers' estimates of the chances of being injured in car accidents are too low, however. Id. at 
42. Experiments also indicate that student subjects believe they are more likely than their classmates 
to experience desirable future events and less likely to experience undesirable events. Hoch, 
Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Personal Events, 11 J. Experimental Psy? 
chology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition 719 (1985); Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About 
Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 806 (1980). Optimism, according to 
Professor Weinstein, apparently is a product of two conditions: 
First, the event is perceived to be controllable, so that there are things one can do or contem? 
plate doing to influence the event. Second, people have some degree of commitment or emo? 
tional investment in the outcome. Under these conditions, optimism arises because people com? 
pare themselves with an inappropriate standard: a person who does little or nothing to improve 
his or her prospects. 
Id. at 814. The application of this idea to the product context is unclear. Weinstein's experimental 
subjects, for example, reported themselves to be somewhat less likely than their fellows to buy a car 
that turns out to be a lemon but more likely to be injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 810. 
52. For a survey of this literature, see R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies 
and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980). 
53. See, e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of fudgment and 
Choice, 32 Ann. Rev. Psychology 53 (1981) (considering complexities involved in evaluating dis? 
crepancies between optimal and observed human responses); Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Func? 
tional and Dysfunctional Aspects of fudgmental Heuristics, 90 Psychological Bull. 197 (1981) 
(examining problems with research that focuses on human judgment in discrete incidents, given that 
judgment actually occurs as continuous, interactive process). 
54. See Lanning, Some Reasons for Distinguishing Between ((Non-normative Response" and "Ir? 
rational Decision," 121 J. Psychology 109 (1987); Macdonald, Credible Conceptions and Implau- 
sible Probabilities, 39 Brit. J. Mathematical & Statistical Psychology 15 (1986). 
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err in a particular direction. The claim holds that people process informa? 
tion in the order of its salience to them. This strategy may be misleading 
because salience supposedly is determined by application of the "availabil? 
ity heuristic," which directs people's attention to information that is vivid 
and easily summoned to mind rather than to more reliable statistical 
data.55 Because negative information about products is often alarming, it 
has high salience. This psychological claim implies, and supporting evi? 
dence predicts, that consumers will attach disproportionate weight to neg? 
ative data, and thus overreact to product-related risks.56 Pessimism as to 
risk levels, if it exists, is less troublesome than optimism because it is less 
stable; firms have an incentive to dissipate it, since pessimistic consumers 
tend to purchase less. Therefore, the psychological studies suggest, if any? 
thing, that consumers are likely to err in the direction that would cause 
them the least harm.57 
The data also suggest that people can be taught to forego bad decision 
55. R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 52, at 45-59. 
56. See Weinberger, Products as Targets of Negative Information: Some Recent Findings, 20 
Eur. J. Marketing 110 (1986) (consumers are believed to attach disproportionate weight to nega? 
tive information about products); Lynch & Srull, Memory and Attentional Factors in Consumer 
Choice: Concepts and Research Methods, 9 J. Consumer Res. 18 (1982); Mizerski, An Attribution 
Explanation of the Disproportionate Influence of Unfavorable Information, 9 J. Consumer Res. 
301 (1982). More recent theory and evidence also suggest that persons are likely to be pessimists with 
regard to product information. Einhorn and Hogarth claim that people who perceive themselves as 
being uncertain about the probabilities they face form subjective probability estimates by a process of 
anchoring and adjustment; they choose a probability and then adjust it upward or downward depend- 
ing on their attitude toward the decision at issue. This can be represented as (p)=p+k, where (p) is 
the subjective probability, p the anchor probability and k the adjustment factor. If k>0, the person 
adjusts upward. This will occur if he attaches greater weight to higher probabilities than lower ones. 
As applied to our subject, k>0 implies pessimism?the overestimate of defect likelihoods. Einhorn 
and Hogarth argue: 
[A]ssume that people are generally cautious in assessing uncertain probabilities. When assess? 
ing loss probabilities, they should therefore give more weight to higher values of the (simu? 
lated) loss probabilities then to lower values. This will result in an overestimation of loss 
probabilities, especially in the low to moderate range. 
Einhorn & Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, 59 J. Bus. 225, 236 (1986). The authors 
claim that the theory applies to preferences regarding warranties (which relate to potential losses); the 
desire for warranties should be strong when loss probabilities are low to moderate, as they often are 
for consumer goods. Their experimental data are consistent with this prediction. More data on other 
aspects of the theory and a fuller statement of it are found in Einhorn & Hogarth, Ambiguity and 
Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference, 92 Psychological Rev. 433 (1985). Jonathan Baron also 
observes that when people are unsure of probabilities "people often behave as if they had assigned 
high probabilities to bad outcomes, thus avoiding actions that might lead to such outcomes even if 
these are the same actions that might lead to the best outcomes." Baron, Second-Order Probabilities 
And Belief Functions, 23 Theory & Decision 25 (1987); see also Oliver & Winer, A Framework 
for the Formation and Structure of Consumer Expectations: Review and Propositions, 8 J. Econ. 
Psych. 469, 490-91 (1987) (people make pessimistic predictions when information is lacking). 
57. A thoughtful argument that regulation based on the current psychology literature is unwise is 
found in Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship 
Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choice, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1986). An 
example of the kind of work that Professor Scott probably had in mind is Lawrence, Towards a More 
Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 Ohio 
St. L.J. 815, 816-17 (1987) ("It is the thesis of this article that the adeptness of salesmanship and 
advertising combined with the limited information and analytical skills processed by a vast majority of 
the consuming public causes most consumer purchases to be irrational."). 
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strategies.58 Further, there is considerable evidence that people respond 
rationally to the provision of information about risk.59 Nor are people 
likely to "overload" when given a substantial amount of such informa? 
tion.60 Disclosure solutions thus seem feasible. 
Recall now the null hypotheses set out above. The evidence supports 
rejection of hypothesis (1); it has not been proven that consumers mis- 
perceive risk levels. The evidence fails to support rejection of hypothesis 
(5); disclosure solutions and education seem promising ways to cure con? 
sumer errors. The evidence as to hypothesis (3), that consumers perceive 
risk levels accurately, is less clear. It apparently is more difficult to justify 
rejecting hypothesis (3) than to justify accepting it, but the issue is close. 
With matters in this state, the disclosure solution is best. 
Disclosure solutions are expensive, however, and the question remains 
what courts should do now. Lawyers commonly answer such questions by 
using largely unstated "tiebreaker" rules. The most influential tiebreaker 
in torts is to compensate victims. This tiebreaker seems to require courts 
58. See, e.g., Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday 
Inductive Reasoning, 90 Psychological Rev. 339 (1983) (training in statistics has marked impact 
on reasoning about everyday problems). 
59. See, e.g., Hoch, supra note 51 (optimism is moderated by provision of appropriate informa? 
tion); D. Kanouse, S. Berry, B. Hayes-Roth, W. Rogers & J. Winkler, Informing Patients 
About Drugs 3 (Rand Report No. R-1800-FDA, 1981) (patients read and learn from prescription 
drug leaflets); Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Accident Possibilities and Seat Belt Usage: A Psycho? 
logical Perspective, 10 Accident Analysis & Prevention 281 (1978) (people react more favorably 
to seat belts and air bags when presented with more salient risk information); Viscusi & O'Connor, 
Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?, 74 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 942 (1984) (workers react appropriately to provision of information about chemical hazards); 
Weinstein, Grubb & Vautier, Increasing Automobile Seat Belt Use: An Intervention Emphasizing 
Risk Susceptibility, 791 J. Applied Psychology 285 (1986) (seat belt use increased through educa? 
tional campaign); Weinstein, supra note 51. In addition, recent experimental evidence shows that 
"subjects can make wide use of statistical information when they realize its situational applicability" 
and "in fact . . . are quite capable of using a wide array of statistical notions . . . ." Kruglanski, 
Friedland & Farkash, Lay Persons' Sensitivity to Statistical Information: The Case ofHigh Perceived 
Applicability, 46 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 503, 515-16 (1984). See also Camerer, Do 
Biases In Probability Judgment Matter In Markets? Experimental Evidence, 11 Am. Econ. Rev. 
981 (1987) (Wharton students do not ignore or underweigh prior probabilities, and prices their be? 
havior generates in experimental markets are close to those that would be generated by Bayesian 
traders?i.e., rational, informed persons). Recent survey research also suggests that awareness of risk 
can be increased substantially by appropriately detailed warnings. See Viscusi, Magat & Huber, In? 
formational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings, 
17 Rand J. Econ. 351 (1986). A less sanguine view about people's responsiveness to disclosure is 
presented in Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 Risk Analysis 403 (1986), 
but Professor Slovic, in concluding, responds to the views of some that the difficulties of providing risk 
data are "insurmountable" by stating: "This seems an unreasonably pessimistic view. Upon closer 
examination, it appears that people understand some things quite well . . . . In situations where 
misunderstanding is rampant, people's errors can often be traced to biased experiences, which educa? 
tion may be able to counter." Id. at 414. This view apparently is gaining adherents. See, e.g., 
Bettman, Payne & Staelin, Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for Presenting 
Risk Information, 5 J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 1 (1987) (arguing that properly designed disclo? 
sure can increase consumer risk awareness). 
60. The objection that disclosure of information respecting harm is unwise because consumers will 
not absorb, or will become confused by, the data is weak, given available evidence. See Grether, 
Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277 (1986). 
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to refuse enforcement of exculpatory clauses and to attempt to create opti? 
mal safety obligations, as does present legal doctrine. Sections I-B and III- 
B together argue that, regardless of what is assumed about consumer 
knowledge and even if one takes the law's compensation goal seriously, 
exculpatory clauses should be banned under this first tiebreaker rule only 
insofar as they shift the risk of pecuniary loss to consumers. 
Another frequently used tiebreaker supports the case for freedom of 
contract. This tiebreaker holds that the state should neither require nor 
prohibit behavior unless the justifications for doing so are clear. The pref? 
erence for passivity in the face of ignorance acquires special force when 
the actions in question would impose high costs on affected persons. The 
strict liability resolution implied by the first tiebreaker requires consumers 
and firms to make a particular insurance contract and no other, and to 
obtain the level of safety that seems best to courts and juries, yet the fac? 
tual basis for these strictures is weak. The strict liability regime also is 
costly to the parties and the state.61 This second tiebreaker therefore im? 
plies that courts should permit exculpatory clauses and enforce whatever 
quality obligations unregulated contracts contain?that, in short, strict lia? 
bility should be repealed. 
The two tiebreakers follow from different attitudes toward risk and a 
different weighing of values. The first tiebreaker holds that, when the 
facts are in doubt, the state should pursue the strategy that minimizes the 
risk of serious disruption in people's lives. Strict liability best achieves this 
result because it compensates the most victims. The second tiebreaker 
holds that, when the facts are in doubt, the state should pursue the strat? 
egy that minimizes government intrusions into people's lives. Although 
this strategy may create risks of serious disruption for some, these intru? 
sions are minimized when people are permitted to set the level of their 
exposure to risk through the contracts they make. This second strategy is 
more consistent with the autonomy-promoting aspect of the consumer sov? 
ereignty norm, but its pursuit is not required by this norm; the respect 
accorded autonomous choices should fail as the belief that those choices 
are informed becomes less plausible. Since this Article's purpose is as 
much clarification as recommendation of reforms, it will conclude this dis? 
cussion with the observation that the answer one gives to the question 
whether courts should impose strict liability or not depends on the 
tiebreaker one uses?that is, on the values one is least willing to sacri- 
61. A recent study prepared for The RAND Corporation estimated that in 1985 the nationwide 
expenditure for tort litigation was between $16 and $19 billion, not including the net compensation 
paid to plaintiffs. These costs primarily involved legal fees and court costs. When the cost of time 
devoted by the parties to litigation is included, net compensation paid constitutes 46% of the total costs 
the system incurred (52% without time costs). See J. Kakalik & N. Pace, Costs and Compensa? 
tion Paid in Tort Litigation (Rand Report No. R-3391-ICJ, 1986). Similar estimates are made 
in Schotter & Ordover, The Cost of the Tort System (Economic Policy Papers, New York University 
Department of Economics, Mar. 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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fice?supposing the facts could leave a reasonable person in doubt. For 
the reasons given in Section I, if strict liability is chosen, the consumer 
sovereignty norm should determine the rules that constitute the strict lia? 
bility doctrine. 
Courts in fact have chosen strict liability, and reflect this choice in their 
abandonment of contract as a risk allocation mechanism and in their ef? 
forts to regulate product quality directly. Even if rejecting contract is justi? 
fiable, it is a separate question whether the current control over product 
quality that courts and juries attempt to exert is justifiable. This regula? 
tion, it will be argued below, has been unfortunate. Section II, in sum, 
criticizes existing law in two fundamental respects, first for adopting strict 
liability (discussed in Section II-B, supra) and second for adopting an 
unwise form of strict liability (discussed in Section II-C, infra). 
Two important aspects of the law's present focus on product quality, 
however, seem sound. First, firms are held to their own promises or rep? 
resentations about quality; this is the law of express warranty. Second, 
firms are required to meet whatever quality standards they themselves 
have adopted; a particular item that fails below its maker's standard has a 
manufacturing defect that will support a claim for liability. These two 
rules create predictable obligations, are easy to administer, and seem im? 
plied by utilitarian and autonomy bases for legal obligations. Judicial ef? 
forts to establish quality obligations that do not depend on a firm's prior 
decisions respecting quality, in contrast, have been unsatisfactory. 
.62 C. Design Defect Tests{ 
A consumer who is injured because of a product's design must prove 
that the design was "defective" to recover damages. Four defect tests are 
discussed: A product's design could be defective if the design (i) is more 
dangerous than the reasonable consumer would expect; (ii) causes accident 
costs that exceed the production costs of redesign; (iii) creates risks in ex? 
cess of its benefits; or (iv) does not comply with applicable statutes or 
regulations. Tests (i), (iii) and (iv) are used in many jurisdictions, but test 
(ii) is not currently employed. None of these tests is satisfactory. 
1. The Expectations Test 
The "consumer expectations test" is undesirable because it is not really 
a defect test at all. A product fails the test when it is less safe than is 
reasonable for consumers to expect, but this raises the question of what 
62. The recent law on design defects is well summarized in Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained 
Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 
575 (1985). See also J. Henderson & A. Twerski, supra note 2, at 507-637 (1987); G. Schwartz, 
Products Liability, supra note 29. For an early recognition of the difficulty that the design defect 
cause of action creates for juries, see Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious De? 
sign Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973). 
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safety expectations are reasonable. Apart from a few obvious cases?it is 
unreasonable to expect cars to float but reasonable to expect them not to 
shed wheels on normal city streets?the reasonableness of safety expecta? 
tions cannot be assessed without using the other tests. For example, it is 
unreasonable of consumers to expect cars to be as crash resistant as tanks 
because they know that the cost of this protection is likely to exceed the 
safety gains. The consumer expectations test in practice, therefore, either 
collapses into the other tests or protects interests distinct from consumer 
expectations. The test sometimes functions as a substitute for a contribu? 
tory negligence defense in states where that defense is not permitted.63 
This occurs when the consumer can take a simple, obvious action to re? 
duce risk, such as closing the cover before striking a match, or not using 
the television in the swimming pool, while the manufacturer would have 
to undertake a costly redesign to realize a similar degree of risk reduction. 
Courts find against injured consumers in these circumstances not on the 
ground that they were negligent, but because the products at issue were at 
least as safe as the reasonable consumer would expect.64 The consumer 
expectations test also permits juries to hold manufacturers liable when 
other bases for liability are absent and the jury wants to compensate the 
plaintiff. 
The consumer expectations test should be abolished. When the test 
functions as a proxy for other tests it is merely confusing. But as a means 
to allow juries to compensate plaintiffs when no basis for legal liability 
exists, the test is unjustifiable. And as a substitute for the contributory 
negligence defense, it is unnecessarily cumbersome since courts can rein- 
state the defense directly. 
2. The Learned Hand Test 
Test (ii) for design defects is the Learned Hand negligence rule, accord? 
ing to which an actor is negligent if the expected accident costs of his 
actions exceed his accident avoidance costs. This test is generally satisfac? 
tory, but unworkable as applied to product design issues. The test rests on 
the important though often unstated assumption that safety expenditures 
made in connection with an activity do not affect the benefits consumers 
derive from the activity. For example, a court using the test to decide 
whether it was negligent for a railroad not to install a device that pre? 
vented an engine from disgorging dangerous sparks can consider only the 
63. See G. Priest, The Disappearance of the Consumer from Modern Products Liability Law 8 
(Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability, Working Paper No. 53, Jan. 1987) (unpublished man? 
uscript on file with author). 
64. A representative case is Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 
Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (product passed consumer expectations test when pool accident 
could have been avoided by consumer putting the ladder in safe position; manufacturer did not have to 
redesign entrance to water). 
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expected accident costs the device would avoid and its cost; the court sensi- 
bly assumes that the benefits people derive from using the railroad will 
not be affected by the legal outcome and can be ignored. 
The assumption that expenditures on safety never influence consumer 
benefits is too strong, however. For example, knife blades sometimes in? 
jure people. The cost to firms of dulling the blades very probably is less 
than the costs of these injuries. The Learned Hand test thus would im? 
pose liability on knife makers. Courts, however, never reach this result 
because it is absurd to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to make a 
knife so dull it can no longer be used as a knife. 
3. The RiskIBenefit Test 
The valid lesson the knife example teaches is that the defectiveness of a 
product's design cannot be decided only by comparing the accident costs 
the design causes with the firm's cost of redesign. Such comparisons would 
require courts to penalize manufacturers for making knives, cars with 
sheet steel, and other useful products. Courts were thus led to test (iii), 
which asserts that a design is defective only if it generates risks exceeding 
its benefits.65 Knives pass this test because their social benefits obviously 
exceed the cost of the injuries they cause. This latter lesson is invalid, 
however, because the risk/benefit test is unworkable in cases that are 
harder to decide than the knife case. 
This point becomes clear if the risk/benefit test is stated precisely. Let 
Y be a vector of benefits consumers obtain from technologically feasible 
designs that could be used to produce generic product A. Design #1 gen? 
erates benefits Kl, design #2 generates benefits K2, and so on, where Kis 
the summary representation of all designs. Similarly, X is the production 
cost vector (design #1 costs XI, etc.) and Z is the accident cost vector 
(design #1 creates Z\ of accident costs, etc). If W is the social welfare 
vector, a firm subject to the law should select the design that maximizes 
the value of the expression W=Y-(X+Z). The firm should produce the 
particular design, for example #8, that generates the greatest benefits 
(K8) net of costs (X8 + Z8). When a firm is sued because its design alleg? 
edly was defective, the jury's role is to ask whether the firm chose the 
design that maximized social welfare. If the firm failed to do this?chose 
design #5 for example?its product is defectively designed. 
The risk/benefit test is too difficult to apply because the benefit term Y 
is impossible for either firms or juries to ascertain. The benefits that par? 
ticular designs would yield are experienced, in considerable part, as sub? 
jective mental states. These benefits vary across persons: Some people feel 
happiest with fast, light, inexpensive cars; others feel happiest with slow, 
65. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27 (1978); 
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850-51 (Tex. 1979). 
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heavy, more expensive but safer cars. Such mental states cannot be mea? 
sured directly and translated into the dollar values the risk/benefit test 
requires. 
This difficulty does not necessarily conclude the matter. In theory, there 
are ways of doing risk/benefit analysis that do not require the direct mea- 
surement of mental satisfaction.66 But these methods are also beyond the 
ability of firms and courts to apply. For example, a relatively simple 
method for evaluating a project67 is to use the Marshallian consumer sur? 
plus.68 A decisionmaker applying this method would need to construct 
risk-adjusted supply and demand curves for all technologically feasible de? 
signs. First, he would have to construct the relevant family of supply 
curves for designs; each supply curve is the sum of a particular pair of X 
and Z cost elements. Then, he would attempt to estimate the demand 
curve that is associated with each supply curve. Doing this latter task 
requires the decisionmaker to predict the quantity of the product that con? 
sumers would purchase at each possible price given the product's design. 
In other words, as Section I-B-2 showed, the decisionmaker would have to 
ascertain consumers' willingness to trade off greater risk reductions for 
higher prices. Next, the decisionmaker would have to calculate the con? 
sumer surplus associated with each design under consideration.69 A chal- 
66. Current techniques of welfare measurement are explained and evaluated in R. Boadway & 
N. Bruce, Welfark Economics (1984). 
67. A particular product design can be considered a "project" in the sense in which this term is 
used in the cost/benefit literature which aims to assist decisionmakers in deciding when particular 
projects should be adopted. See id. at 292-315. 
68. For a critical analysis of this welfare measure, see R. Tresch, Public Finance: A Norma? 
tive Theory 196-98 (1981). 
69. This analysis may be clarified by a diagram: 
In the picture, 5 is the supply curve, D is the demand curve and the equilibrium market price and the 
quantity sold are P* and Q*, respectively. Marginal buyers will pay no more than the market price 
for the product. If buyers are thought of as points on the demand curve, all buyers above the point 
that P* represents derive "surplus" from being able to purchase at the market price, in the sense that 
they would still buy if the price rose. Their surplus is the difference between their willingness to 
pay?their point on the demand curve?and the market price P*. The sum of these surpluses is the 
area represented by the shaded triangle. If sellers use a more expensive but safer design, the supply 
curve will shift up and to the left?it will take a higher unit price to call forth the same number of 
units?and the demand curve would shift up and to the right?buyers will pay more per unit because 
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lenged product would be defectively designed?its design would fail the 
risk/benefit test?if the consumer surplus associated with it is lower than 
the surplus that any other technologically feasible design would have 
generated. 
This conceptualization of the risk/benefit test is sound in theory, but 
firms and juries cannot apply it in practice. Constructing the risk-adjusted 
supply and demand curves and associated Marshallian consumer surplus 
for a product in current use is a difficult task for experts; requiring juries 
to construct a family of hypothetical supply and demand curves is asking 
statues to dance.70 In practice, no one constructs supply and demand 
curves or attempts to estimate any elements of the social welfare equation 
precisely. Rather, courts ask juries, or themselves decide, whether a design 
is "defective" or creates "unreasonable" risks, based on the story of the 
accident contained in the record and the conflicting testimony of the par? 
ties' engineering experts as to the technical aspects of various designs. 
Consumers' willingness to pay and the benefits that various incarnations 
of the product could generate necessarily play almost no role in decisions, 
and there seldom is evidence regarding the accident costs associated with 
these never-used designs. This procedure gives firms little guidance in 
constructing products and turns design defect litigation into a lottery. 
These outcomes should not be surprising: Courts perform poorly when 
asked to do tasks beyond their competence, such as complex cost/benefit 
analysis. 
4. The Regulatory Compliance Test 
Defect test (iv) has two aspects. First, it holds that a firm whose prod? 
uct fails to satisfy a regulatory standard (a "regulation") is negligent per 
se.71 Second, it provides that a firm whose product complies with a regu- 
the product is safer. If the new design reduces accident costs by more than its cost, the demand curve 
will shift more than the supply curve. As a result, the "consumer surplus triangle" derived from these 
new curves will be larger than the original triangle. Consequently, the unmodified product was not 
the best, in the welfare sense, that could have been supplied. The Marshallian consumer surplus is 
only a rough measure of welfare change because it ignores income effects, that is, changes in demand 
attributable to changes in wealth that result from new prices caused by different product 
configurations. 
70. See Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic 
Analysis, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 2045 (1984). This student note recognized that the risk/benefit test 
requires a welfare analysis, but argued that "proxies" for consumer surplus measures exist that make 
the risk/benefit test manageable. These proxies are "industry standards . . ., government regulation, 
and the financial success of other manufacturers' products . . . ." Id. at 2059-60. The Note does not 
explain how the study of a government safety regulation, or any other of these proxies, could deter? 
mine which technologically feasible designs would generate the largest consumer surplus. 
One might argue that the judicial system does not expressly regulate product quality under the 
risk/benefit test, but merely decides what is impermissible. This is a fine distinction when the issue in 
a case is whether a product is defective because it did not use shatterproof glass or contain an auto? 
matic shut-off switch, for example, and there is a finding of defectiveness. Also, delineating the set of 
permissible designs is itself an important form of regulation. 
71. Hereinafter "regulations" will be used to refer to both statutes and regulations. 
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lation is not thereby exculpated; rather, compliance is just evidence rele? 
vant to the question whether the product is defective. A jury remains free 
to find the product defective on the ground that it failed another test.72 
The regulatory compliance test is unsatisfactory for two reasons: (a) 
Agencies are better than courts and juries at devising regulations; and (b) 
Letting juries review regulations creates considerable uncertainty for 
firms. A rule that retains the first aspect of test (iv) but alters the second, 
so that compliance with a regulation is exculpatory per se, would be pref? 
erable. The principal justification for rejecting such a rule?for current 
law?is that any other rule would create incorrect incentives for firms to 
produce safety. This justification is unpersuasive. 
Current law is unsatisfactory because administrative agencies are more 
likely than courts and juries to devise good regulations. This is not only 
because agencies often have more expertise, but also because there are 
economies of scale to regulation. Any regulator must answer two ques? 
tions. First, what substantive standard should guide the choice of regula? 
tions? Second, what resource level should be devoted to deciding whether 
a proposed regulation meets the standard? A jury concerned with setting a 
quality standard does not make its own investigation but relies on the 
litigants for data. A private litigant will answer the second question asked 
by comparing the expected gain to her from discovering more informa? 
tion?the increased likelihood of winning the suit?with the expected in? 
vestigation cost. If the technical and economic questions at issue are com? 
plex, private litigants will provide relatively little information unless the 
amount at stake is quite high. In contrast, for an agency, in theory any- 
way, the expected gain from discovering further information is a function 
of the benefits that better regulation will confer on all potentially affected 
persons. As this gain commonly exceeds the gain to any private litigant, 
an agency rationally would spend more than the litigant in investigating a 
particular design, were both to face the same budget constraint. Also, 
agencies generally have larger budgets than typical litigants have. Conse? 
quently, an agency commonly will have a much fuller record on which to 
evaluate a particular design than will a court or jury, and so will be more 
likely, other things being equal, to make a sensible evaluation. In addition, 
were compliance with regulations exculpatory per se, firms would be bet? 
ter able to predict their legal obligations. Perhaps a more vivid way to 
make these points is to observe that an appellate court would review an 
agency's regulation under the substantial evidence test, on the ground of 
72. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 288C (1965). This aspect of the fourth test 
actually is a rule of construction that applies when it is unclear whether a safety regulation was meant 
to preempt common law interventions or to permit them to supplement its application. The discussion 
below supposes that the relevant regulation is the product of an institutional process that keeps 
abreast of technological change; regulations that have become outmoded by events should be supple- 
mented by the courts unless the regulations were clearly meant to be exclusive. 
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agency superiority over courts in devising regulations, while lay juries in 
design defect cases review agency output de novo. This contradicts the 
received wisdom respecting the appropriate roles of courts and agencies in 
regulation. 
However, making compliance with regulations exculpatory per se, it 
has been claimed, may create incorrect incentives for firms to produce 
safety when firms in a particular market all cannot produce safety at the 
same cost.73 Each such firm should then be encouraged to produce safety 
until its marginal cost of doing so equals the marginal gain in reduced 
accident costs. Regulations, however, often are set such that products are 
as safe as they would be under a strict liability regime that induced the 
median firm in an industry to equate its marginal costs and benefits from 
further safety. Were compliance with regulations exculpatory, firms that 
could produce safety at below average cost thus would not be induced to 
equate their own marginal costs and benefits, and so produce more safety 
than the norm, but instead would invest only the industry average in mak? 
ing products safer. Consequently, a rule making compliance with regula? 
tions exculpatory per se would yield suboptimal amounts of safety. 
This justification for current law is unpersuasive because current law 
also creates incorrect incentives for firms. To see how, suppose that under 
this law a particular regulation creates a safety obligation that is optimal 
for the median-cost firm in an industry; call this safety obligation Q*. Let 
Q be the amount of safety each firm will produce under the regulation. 
Were all firms to be producing safety optimally, only the median-cost firm 
would choose Q=Q*; firms that can produce safety only at high cost 
would set Q<Q*, while low cost firms would set Q>Q*. 
Current law precludes this result. Initially, the rule that noncompliance 
with a regulation is negligence per se induces high cost firms to set Q at 
least equal to Q*; these firms thus overproduce safety. Nor does the rule 
making compliance with a regulation evidentiary only induce low-cost 
firms to produce the optimal amount. Today, juries are not instructed to 
hold liable firms that should, but failed to, choose a Q>Q*. Such an in? 
struction in fact would be unhelpful because reconstructing a firm's pro? 
duction function ex post seems beyond a jury's competence. Juries thus 
simply review regulations, holding liable firms that comply if juries be? 
lieve the safety standard embodied in the regulation is too low, or excul- 
pating firms if the standard is found acceptable. Hence, no firm subject to 
the regulation will be induced to equate its own marginal costs and bene- 
73. See Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). 
When all firms in an industry have the same costs, current law is desirable on safety grounds only if 
juries are better than agencies at setting safety standards. For the reasons given above, this seems 
unlikely. Courts do not distinguish between heterogeneous and homogeneous cost industries; rather, 
they seem to believe that allowing juries to sanction firms that have complied with regulations will 
produce more safety. This belief is correct but not germane: The issue is whether the increased safety 
is purchased at a price informed consumers would pay. 
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fits from producing safety. Instead, all firms will choose Qs?decide how 
much safety to produce?by anchoring on Q*; that is, firms probably will 
suppose they can escape liability if they produce an amount of safety Q 
according to the rule Q=Q* + e, where e is an error term. This term will 
be positive because juries are instructed always to hold firms liable that 
produce Q<Q* anc* will sometimes hold firms liable that produce Q>Q*. 
Because the error term is a function of what juries are predicted to do, 
there is no reason to believe that Qs chosen according to this rule will 
equate any firm's marginal costs with the benefits of producing safety. 
Current law respecting compliance with regulations, in sum, induces 
firms with high costs for producing safety to produce an excessive amount 
of it while not ensuring that low-cost firms produce the correct amount. 
Changing the law to make compliance with regulations exculpatory will 
permit high-cost firms more closely to equate the marginal costs and bene? 
fits from safety but reduce the incentive of low-cost firms to make their 
products safer. The choice thus is between two rules neither of which can 
ensure that firms will produce the optimal amount of safety. Current law 
nevertheless is unsatisfactory because it is preferable for all firms to clus- 
ter around Q*?to produce the amount of safety a regulation re? 
quires?than to cluster around a quality standard that is derived in con- 
siderable part from predictions about what juries will do. Agency 
expertise and access to information probably ensure that fewer distortions 
in the production of safety will exist when firms are closer to the former 
standard than to the latter.74 Further, making compliance with regulations 
controlling on the defect issue will reduce uncertainty. The regulatory 
compliance test thus should be changed.75 
74. Were true strict liability to obtain, so that a firm would be held liable whenever its product 
caused harm and regardless of the precautions it took, firms would have an incentive to equate the 
marginal costs and gains of further safety. There would then seem little point to setting safety stan? 
dards by regulation. Were an applicable regulation to exist, the better rule would be to make compli? 
ance with it exculpatory. The alternative would be to hold the firm liable whenever its product caused 
harm, since the adoption of true strict liability foreclosed the option of reviewing the firm's conduct. 
But to hold firms liable according to this rule would be to make the regulation a largely wasted effort. 
75. Making compliance with regulations exculpatory would be undesirable if legislatures or agen? 
cies routinely require safety levels that are too low. This could occur if firms commonly "capture" the 
regulatory institutions. See generally T. Romer & H. Rosenthal, Modern Political Economy and the 
Study of Regulation (Carnegie-Mellon University Graduate School of Industrial Administration, 
Working Paper No. 3-85-86, Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (reviewing 
modern theory concerning how regulations emerge from political process). An excellent short treat? 
ment of capture theory is M. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A 
Critique of Capture Theory (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Basing legal rules 
on the likelihood of capture seems unwise, however, because capture?the creation of regulations that 
reflect only the interests of firms?does not always occur and it is very difficult to determine when it 
has actually happened. The political economy literature considers the demand and supply side of the 
"market for regulation." See id. at 5-8 (discussing work of George Stigler). On the demand side, 
groups with low coalition costs and a comparative advantage at solving free rider problems have an 
above average ability to secure laws that benefit themselves at the expense of other groups. Producer 
groups sometimes have these characteristics, but other groups do also. For example, consumer, labor, 
and environmental groups have had considerable success in influencing health and safety regulation. 
This success suggests that some regulations will be influenced by capture by producer groups, but 
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D. Summary 
The rejection of contract as a mechanism to govern product defect dis? 
putes required courts to devise a substitute. Their choice was to hold lia? 
ble firms whose products cause harm when these products are "defective" 
according to standards that courts create and juries apply; the standards 
are embodied in "tests" of defectiveness. None of these tests is satisfactory. 
The expectations and risk/benefit tests are unworkable and the regulatory 
compliance test should be changed substantially. Even if the latter change 
is made, the question will remain what courts should do in the many cases 
where no applicable regulations exist. This and related questions are the 
subject of Section III. 
III. Proposals for Reform 
A. A Substitute for Defect Tests: True Strict Liability with Contributory 
Negligence 
1. The Substitute Described 
The seemingly insoluble difficulties with common law defect tests sug? 
gest abandoning the notion that a "defective" design is a prerequisite to 
liability. This Section argues that courts should give up the attempt to 
regulate products directly and proposes a rule under which firms would 
be held liable whenever their designs cause injury. Contributory negli? 
gence and assumption of risk, however, would be complete defenses. The 
solution is described intuitively. An Appendix contains a formal 
presentation. 
Strict liability with a contributory negligence defense is attractive be? 
cause it yields efficient results. Assume that consumers know what safe 
use entails and that total accident costs would be optimally reduced if both 
consumers and firms exercised care. A consumer who takes care incurs no 
accident costs; the proposed legal rule holds firms liable unless consumers 
are careless. On the other hand, a consumer who fails to take care bears 
other regulations will not. It is questionable whether courts or juries could identify "captured" regula? 
tions accurately on a case-by-case basis. 
When supply side considerations are added, the possibility of identifying regulations tainted by 
capture becomes even more remote. The supply side literature asks when legal institutions will "sup? 
ply" laws that are in the interest of particular groups. See id. This turns out to be a complex question. 
Agencies are recognized to have "competing principals," such as oversight committees in legislative 
bodies, legislatures themselves, and various parts of the executive branch. Agency outputs are the 
result of a complex "game" between agencies, these principals, and the nongovernmental interests 
demanding or opposing regulation. Political theorists do not claim to be able to predict the outcomes of 
such games with great accuracy. Courts are unlikely to do better. Thus, the effective choice for courts 
is to presume that capture always happens or that it never does. To make the latter choice is to hold 
that the possibility of capture is irrelevant to the choice of common law rules. This is the better result 
because courts should have a presumption in favor of the legitimacy of the actions of coordinate 
branches of government. Hence, it appears best to adopt the rule that noncompliance with regulations 
is per se negligence and compliance per se exculpatory. 
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all accident costs; contributory negligence is a complete defense. Since a 
consumer's failure to take care will constitute contributory negligence only 
if the consumer's expected costs of care are lower than the expected costs 
of the accidents that care would avoid,76 these informed consumers will by 
and large adopt the cost-minimizing strategy of taking care. Therefore, 
firms will incur all accident costs their designs cause. The cost-minimizing 
strategy for firms in this circumstance is to make optimal investments in 
safety?to invest in safety until the cost of further investments equals the 
gain in the reduction of expected accident costs. Because it induces both 
consumers and firms to reduce accident costs optimally, strict liability with 
contributory negligence is efficient. 
This analysis makes strong assumptions about what consumers know. It 
is an open question whether its conclusion still holds when these assump? 
tions are relaxed. To pursue this question, one should realize that what 
constitutes due care for a consumer is often a function of the firm's safety 
efforts. For example, if a car has good brakes, driving sixty miles an hour 
on a highway is not careless, although driving one hundred miles an hour 
might be; if the car has bad brakes, driving forty miles an hour might be 
careless. If contributory negligence is the failure to take the care that the 
circumstances warrant, a consumer who fails to drive slowly when the 
brakes are bad would be contributorily negligent. The analysis above ar? 
gued that consumers will behave optimally in light of the actions taken by 
firms. It thus assumed that consumers know what steps firms have 
taken?that is, consumers know just how safe or dangerous products are. 
The assumption that consumers have perfect information is illegitimate, 
however; if consumers know how safe products are, there is no need for 
any form of strict liability, yet we suppose that some form of strict liabil? 
ity is justified because information is imperfect. 
An appropriate definition of contributory negligence will cure this diffi? 
culty: Contributory negligence should be defined as a consumer's failure 
to take due care when using a product that is optimally safe.77 In the 
illustration above, this rule would permit consumers to drive sixty miles 
per hour, but not one hundred miles per hour, regardless of the actual 
state of the brakes. A consumer who drove sixty miles per hour and was 
injured because the brakes were bad would not be contributorily negli? 
gent, and the firm would bear all costs. If consumers do not know how 
safe products are but do know how to use safe products, they will take the 
cost-justified care that safe products require for the reasons given. Conse? 
quently, firms will face all accident costs and will respond by taking due 
76. Negligence is the failure to take cost-justified steps to reduce accidents. 
77. This is the governing rule in many states. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 
725, 735, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978). 
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care. Hence, the appropriate contributory negligence rule solves the prob? 
lem of consumers misspecifying risks. 
Current law deviates in two ways from the strict liability with contribu? 
tory negligence solution. First, a sizable minority of states allow only a 
contributory negligence defense that resembles assumption of risk.78 A 
consumer is required only to take the care that her actual knowledge of 
product safety requires. She is negligent if she drives sixty miles per hour 
knowing the brakes are bad, but is not negligent if she is ignorant of the 
true state of the brakes, yet speeds. This rule is inefficient. It creates an 
incentive for consumers to be careless and thus leads to excessive accidents 
and excessive investments in safety by firms to make up for consumer 
carelessness. 
Second, jurisdictions that do require consumers to behave non- 
negligently commonly use comparative negligence. Under such a regime, 
consumer misbehavior reduces, but does not bar, recovery.79 In the prod? 
ucts liability context, a consumer is negligent when she fails to take the 
care that is required given an optimally safe product, and the firm is 
"negligent" if its product fails the risk/benefit test. When both parties are 
found negligent, the jury apportions liability between them. Comparative 
negligence, however, is an undesirable rule in products liability law. 
To see why, realize first that comparative negligence is efficient if firms 
bear no accident costs when they are not negligent. In this event, firms can 
and will avoid all losses by complying with the due care standard, suppos- 
ing it to be correctly set at the level where the marginal cost of safety 
equals its marginal benefit. Consumers will then bear all losses and also 
take due care because they cannot do better than avoiding only those losses 
it is worth it to them to avoid. Interestingly, the result that comparative 
negligence induces optimal behavior has been shown to hold in the case 
when both parties are negligent and the accident cost is apportioned be? 
tween them according to some sharing rule.80 A comparative negligence 
regime thus is unobjectionable, and perhaps on equity grounds desirable, 
when juries can assess the negligence of firms. The risk/benefit test is 
supposed to enable juries to do this in products liability cases, but this test 
is unworkable. If it is abandoned, comparative negligence must be aban? 
doned as well because, when a consumer is negligent, there will remain no 
way to decide whether the firm should bear any portion of the loss; in? 
quiries into the behavior of the firm are foreclosed ex hypothesis.81 In a 
78. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
79. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
80. See Cooter & Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 201 
(1987); Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. Legal Stud. 49 
(1985); S. Rea, The Economics of Comparative Negligence (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author). 
81. That comparative negligence cannot be combined with strict liability was pointed out in the 
Daly dissents written by Judge Jefferson and Judge Mosk, 20 Cal. 3d at 750, 757, 575 P.2d at 1177, 
1988] Products Liability 395 
regime of true strict liability for firms, therefore, an optimal amount of 
safety will be produced only if contributory negligence is a complete de? 
fense to liability. 
This legal regime will be more administratively efficient than current 
law because true strict liability greatly reduces the information demands 
on juries. The substantive issue in litigation will be: What constitutes op? 
timal consumer care given that the product is safe? This question is much 
easier for juries to answer than the questions posed by the risk/benefit 
test.82 
Some may object that this question is as difficult for juries as those they 
now face. The objection is this: A consumer is contributorily negligent 
when the costs to her of behaving carefully are less than the expected 
accident costs that care would avoid. Yet consumer care costs in considera- 
ble part are opportunity costs: the detriment to a consumer of not exceed- 
ing the speed limit is the pleasure foregone from driving fast or the un- 
happiness of arriving late. Juries, the argument goes, are no more able to 
assess these opportunity costs than they are to measure consumer benefits 
from various designs. Hence, the solution of strict liability with a contrib? 
utory negligence defense simply substitutes one insoluble measurement 
problem?determining consumer care?for another?applying the risk/ 
benefit test. 
This objection is unpersuasive because mental states have never been 
relevant in determining human actors' negligence. Considering mental 
states not only introduces a severe measurement difficulty, but also raises 
the utility monster problem. Thus, a tort defendant cannot claim that 
driving 100 miles an hour in a school zone was not negligence because she 
derived enough pleasure from frightening children to outweigh the utility 
losses to her victims and their parents. The negligence of real per? 
sons?here consumers?is assessed by asking whether they failed to follow 
directions, ignored warnings, or took actions that most people would re? 
gard as being more risky to others than the actions were worth. Whether 
1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395, 399, and in Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negli? 
gence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 337 (1977). These analysts 
argued that contributory negligence should not be a defense in strict liability at all. Only the assump? 
tion of risk defense should be allowed, and it should bar all recovery so there would be no apportion? 
ment problem. The Daly majority responded to this argument by asserting that juries could reach a 
"fair apportionment of liability," 20 Cal. 3d at 738, because they would not be comparing fault but 
instead making an 
" 
'equitable apportionment or allocation of loss.' 
" 20 Cal. 3d at 736. The "equita? 
ble" principles by which juries' decisions are to be governed were never set out. 
82. The administrative advantage of the suggested reform can be obtained without incurring one 
of the disadvantages of a similar true strict liability regime, workers' compensation, which is a reduc? 
tion in workers' incentive to be careful. Pure workers' compensation increases the incentive of firms to 
be careful but reduces the incentive of employees to be careful, especially if it increases the expected 
value of compensation over that of a tort regime. Thus, introducing a workers' compensation regime 
simpliciter could increase the accident rate in industries where employees have a comparative advan? 
tage at producing safety. See Fishback, Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the Workplace: 
Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, 16 J. Legal Stud. 305 (1987) (introducing 
workers' compensation increased rate of fatal accidents in coal industry). 
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a consumer has acted in this way in a particular case poses an easier 
question than those posed by the risk/benefit test. Accordingly, the sug? 
gested reform will have the administrative advantages claimed for it. 
There is, however, a problem in putting such stress on defenses. The 
analysis above supposed that consumers always know what constitutes due 
care in connection with optimally safe products. Consumers sometimes 
may be less informed. For example, the appropriate dosage for a particu? 
lar drug is seldom self-evident. This difficulty is met today by requiring 
firms to provide warnings. 
2. Warnings 
The law on warnings raises two questions: First, what is the legal ef? 
fect of a good warning? Second, how good must a warning be? Warnings 
are used as evidence of whether a consumer assumed the risk or was con- 
tributorily negligent. The better the warning, the more likely that a ver? 
dict for the defendant will be upheld on appeal, and the more likely that a 
court will direct a verdict for the defendant.83 A warning thus must be 
good enough to persuade the trier of fact that the consumer should have 
heeded it. This is an imprecise standard because its application turns out 
to be in considerable part a function of the trier's views about consumers' 
competence. 
This Section argues that courts should attach greater evidentiary weight 
to warnings.84 Warnings serve two functions: They indicate risk levels 
and provide directions for safe use. Disclosing risk level data is difficult 
because "point predictions," such as that a car has a .01 probability of a 
defect, may not accurately describe the likelihood of various harms. 
Probability density functions, however, are difficult to create and may not 
be helpful to many consumers.85 Thus, firms frequently must use impre? 
cise phrases such as "highly dangerous." As shown in Section III-A-1 
83. See, e.g., Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655 (1986) (clear warn? 
ing that would have avoided accident was basis of summary judgment for defendant manufacturer). 
84. Current judicial attitudes toward warnings are illustrated in Watson v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 
775 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (jury could find inadequate an instruction pasted on portable phone 
that read "CAUTION?LOUD RING. Move switch to talk position before holding receiver to the 
ear;" court gave no rationale and accident occurred when plaintiff forgot instruction); Givens v. Led- 
erle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (jury could find that plaintiff should have been told that Sabin 
oral polio vaccine could, rather than rarely could, cause polio; risk of polio from vaccine was one in 
three million); Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (jury could find failure to 
warn of hidden dangers for risk that 16-month-old child could choke on peanut butter sandwich); 
Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (1978) (jury could find warning inadequate 
that instructed persons not to use sinus medicine for more than ten days without consulting a physi? 
cian because prolonged use "may damage the kidneys"; plaintiff used medicine for eight years; court 
said warning should have added that drug was "dangerous"). 
85. A probability density function indicates the probability that a product will cause various levels 
of damage. For example, a simple density function would be that product X has a .01 chance of 
causing $10 worth of harm, a .01 chance of causing $100 worth of harm, and a .03 chance of causing 
$50 worth of harm. Some consumers may have difficulty understanding more complex functions, and 
portraying them also would be difficult. 
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above, these instructions will permit consumers to behave optimally if con? 
sumers also are instructed as to what constitutes safe use, and are found to 
be contributorily negligent, or to have assumed the risk, if they fail to 
follow instructions. 
What instructions are appropriate is a difficult question. Consider the 
following example:86 Consumers do not know that a chemical product is 
flammable or how to reduce the danger unless they are told. The product 
label states "Danger! Product Flammable: Do Not Use Near Open 
Flames." This instruction is imprecise because "near" is a loose term; the 
product's propensity to harm could be eliminated simply by avoiding close 
proximity to open flame, or the product could be so volatile that its vapors 
would ignite were it used in a room with a stove pilot light. If the latter is 
the case, the label perhaps should have provided more information. Labels 
have little room, however, and therefore usually give only "category" in? 
structions, such as "avoid open flames," which leave consumers with con? 
siderable discretion. 
An implication of the unavoidable imprecision of a firm's communica? 
tions about risk levels and instructions is that, viewed ex post, there al? 
ways exists a warning and set of instructions that were not given and that 
would have induced the injured consumer to avoid injury. The actual 
communication did not prevent the accident and thus could have been 
more explicit. Therefore, warning cases often permit contradictory out? 
comes: either the warning and instructions may together be found excul? 
patory because the firm said enough, given the constraint of label size, or 
the warning and instructions may be found defective because too little was 
said to tell the "typical person" about the risk and means to avoid it. This 
is why warning cases are often resolved according to the decisionmaker's 
presuppositions about consumer competence. A judge either assumes, sub? 
ject to the evidence, that consumers generally can draw the appropriate 
inferences from general warnings of danger and category instructions, or 
she assumes the contrary. 
Many courts appear to make the latter assumption,87 which implies 
86. The illustration is drawn from two cases which evaluated the warning given with the sale of a 
contact adhesive that ignited while being applied in the home, causing serious harm to users. Compare 
Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976) (jury could find inadequate a warning that 
said "Danger! Extremely Flammable . . . Do Not Use Near Fire or Flame") with Murray v. Wilson 
Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1973) (roughly similar warning adequate as matter of law). 
87. See supra note 84. Courts also hold firms liable when accidents result from misuse of the 
product, if the misuse was foreseeable by firms. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 
N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S. 2d 115, 120-21 (1976). This rule is consistent with many courts' rejec? 
tion of a contributory negligence defense since misuse would be contributory negligence. The rule 
sometimes may be justifiable as applied; victim misuse can imply an inadequate warning. On the 
other hand, misuse cases supply many of the horrors cited in the current debate about products liabil? 
ity reform. A typical example is Moran v. Faberge, Inc, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). In this 
case, the plaintiff successfully sued for injuries caused when her friend poured cologne on a lit candle 
to make the candle scented and the cologne ignited. The manufacturer had failed to warn that cologne 
was flammable. 
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that a legal solution to the design defect problem that relies heavily on 
defenses and warnings may work poorly. Three arguments suggest that 
warnings should be regarded as generally efficacious, however. First, the 
evidence cited in Section II-B-1 shows that consumers respond appropri? 
ately to the provision of safety information. Also, what constitutes safe use 
of many products is common knowledge or easily learned. Thus, it is 
plausible to suppose that typical general warnings and category instruc? 
tions are adequate, subject to particular contrary evidence. Second, the 
commitment of juries to the compensation goal suggests that juries seldom 
will find contributory negligence when it is absent.88 Therefore, the fear 
that consumers would bear excessive accidents costs in a world where ade? 
quate warnings are exculpatory seems unwarranted. Third, a commitment 
to consumer sovereignty is inconsistent with a general disbelief in the effi? 
cacy of warnings. This norm presupposes two claims: (a) People can per? 
form adequately most of the tasks that life requires; and (b) Seeing to 
one's safety and making contracts in one's own interest are two such tasks. 
Few people would reject claim (a), for doing so would call many deeply 
held views into question, such as that an informed citizenry is the best 
safeguard of our liberties.89 Acceptance of claim (a) should incline one to 
accept claim (b). Self-protection and economic activity are important, fre? 
quently performed life tasks, and seem no more complex than other activi? 
ties that claim (a) assumes people are competent to pursue. 
The three reasons given here together suggest that courts should reest- 
ablish a contributory negligence defense and be more reluctant than they 
now are to let juries speculate about the adequacy of warnings.90 
3. The Test Applied 
To test the plausibility of the proposed reform, consider how it would 
resolve four typical cases. In case (a), a consumer purchases a Volkswagen 
Golf and is injured when, with no negligence on her part, the Golf 
crashes into a tree. She sues, claiming that had the car been composed of 
much heavier metal, she would not have been injured. Under the proposed 
rule?and current law?the consumer loses; she knew or should have 
88. The existence of this commitment is being verified. The odds of plaintiffs winning jury ver? 
dicts, and winning larger awards in complex cases, are increasing. See M. Peterson, Civil Juries 
in the 1980s: Trends in Jury Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illi? 
nois (Rand Report No. R-3466ICJ, 1987). Also, when other factors of the case are held constant, 
juries are more likely to find against wealthy, corporate defendants. See Wittman, The Price of Negli? 
gence Under Differing Liability Rules, 21 J.L. & Econ. 151, 152 n.3 (1986); Wittman, The Behav? 
ior of Litigants, Juries and Professional Arbitrators in Civil Cases: An Empirical Study of Coopera? 
tive Justice and the Issue of "Deep Pockets" (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
89. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (free trade in 
ideas indispensible to preserving democratic government). 
90. For the reasons given in Section II-C-4, supra, a firm's compliance with a statute or regula? 
tion on warnings should be exculpatory rather than evidence on the firm's behalf, as it is now. 
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known that Volkswagens are less crashworthy than Rolls Royces, and 
therefore assumed the risk.91 
In case (b), a magic metal which existed when the Volkswagen was sold 
would have made the Volkswagen as safe in crashes as today's Rolls 
Royce, though the Volkswagen would have weighed no more than normal 
Volkswagens. The manufacturer did not use the magic metal because it 
would have added $500 to the car's costs and cars made of magic metal 
are much more expensive to repaint and hammer out in the event of 
scrapes and dents. Under current law, the manufacturer would be liable 
only if Golfs with magic metal did better on the risk/benefit test than 
Golfs without it. Under the proposed test, the manufacturer would be lia? 
ble unless it gave an adequate warning that informed consumers of the 
additional risk of not using the magic metal. The consumer did not as? 
sume the risk in this second case because, without such a warning, she 
was unaware of the full set of options provided by the market. 
In case (a), consumers are as well informed as the firm about the design 
choice. They know that Rolls Royces are safer but more expensive than 
Volkswagens. Hence, the VW maker's design choice would be optimal, 
for it had to satisfy informed persons. In case (b), the consumer is not 
similarly informed. Ordinary people lack the information and expertise to 
make the technological choices involved in metal selection. Hence, the 
firm's design choice cannot be presumed to be optimal.92 
True strict liability is justified in case (b) for three reasons: (i) If use of 
the magic metal is optimal, given that the consumers behave nonneg- 
ligently, the firm will be induced to use it; (ii) If use of the metal is not 
cost justified, the price of Golfs nevertheless will more accurately reflect 
their accident costs, thereby better informing consumers of the risk of driv? 
ing (just as a warning would); (iii) The administrative costs of trials 
would be reduced and their results made more predictable because the 
only issue would be the adequacy of the warning (if one were given). The 
law would not demand a complex risk/benefit test.93 
91. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (firm not liable for 
design of van that positioned driver in front of motor so that motor offered no protection in event of 
crash); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Trabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774 (1975) ("The pur? 
chaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the same degree of safety as would the buyer of the 
much more expensive Cadillac"). 
92. For similar reasons, the question whether cars are defectively designed when they lack airbags 
fails within case (a) rather than case (b). Consumers know that airbags exist, are safer than not using 
seat belts, and would increase the price of cars by a nontrivial amount. The failure of firms to use 
them thus seems a response to consumer preference. 
93. Current legal doctrines often resolve case (b) against firms. The cases are more complex than 
they would be under the proposed reform, however. For example, Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 
F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), affirmed a jury verdict against Chrysler 
because its cars lacked rigid side bars that would have better protected the driver in a sideways colli- 
sion. Id. at 954. The bars would have added $302 to the car's price and made it heavier and possibly 
more dangerous in a front-end collision. The outcome is problematic under current law since the 
evidence given at trial did not indicate whether cars with or without side bars did better on the risk/ 
benefit test. The Dawson line of cases has been strongly criticized on these grounds. See J. Hender- 
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In case (c), magic metal is invented after the Golf is sold. A majority of 
jurisdictions today, applying the state-of-the-art defense, would exculpate 
the manufacturer on the ground that consumers could not expect products 
to contain features whose use was infeasible when the products were 
made.94 Scholars criticize this rule as creating insufficient incentives for 
firms to develop safety improvements.95 Two alternative rules may be con? 
sidered. One rule would hold that liability depends on the effectiveness of 
a firm's research program. If a firm had an optimal safety research pro? 
gram and did not discover a safety improvement, then it would not be held 
liable. Such a program would require a firm to equate the marginal costs 
of safety research with its marginal gains. These gains would be the in? 
creased profits resulting from lowering expected accident costs through 
improved safety information.96 The other alternative would be to hold the 
firm liable absolutely, that is, liable regardless of when knowledge of the 
safety improvement could have been learned. 
If courts can accurately set the due care research standard required by 
the first rule, the two alternative rules create identical and optimal incen? 
tives for firms to do safety research. Should firms be held liable regardless 
of how much research they do, as under the second rule, they will conduct 
research until the marginal costs of further research equal the marginal 
gains from increased safety information. The first rule ideally sets the due 
care standard at the point at which the marginal costs and gains of further 
research are equal. Hence, if firms believe that the due care standard will 
be accurately established and applied, they will do as much, and no more, 
research under it as under a rule of absolute liability. Equating the mar? 
ginal costs and benefits of research programs, however, seems more diffi? 
cult than an ordinary negligence question. If some inaccuracy in courts' 
decisions on this matter is assumed, choosing between absolute liability 
and negligence as a replacement for the current state-of-the-art rule is 
difficult. On the one hand, absolute liability is easy to administer and 
creates the correct private incentives for research. On the other hand, ab? 
solute liability creates considerable uncertainty; firms cannot predict their 
future liability. The incentives created under this standard also may not 
be socially optimal. This is because research is a public good97 that firms 
doing the privately optimal amount of research are likely to underprovide. 
Thus, inaccuracy in the judicial application of a negligence rule would be 
son & A. Twerski, supra note 2, at 572-73, 580-85. This criticism is misdirected since the firm 
should be held liable. The solution proposed here does this more simply, however. 
94. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976). 
95. See Calabresi & Klevorik, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1985). 
96. The nature of an optimal research program is described in Schwartz, Products Liability, 
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. 
Legal Stud. 689, 695-703 (1985). 
97. In economics, a public good is one whose benefits are indivisible and widely dispersed. Firms 
cannot subdivide such a good so as to sell it only to those benefiting from it, causing it to be underpro- 
vided by private firms. See P. Samuelson & W. Nordhaus, supra note 44, at 48-49, 713. 
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desirable if it induced firms to research somewhat excessively. There is no 
simple way to resolve these competing considerations, but the probable 
likelihood of overcompliance with a negligence rule argues for that rule's 
desirability. 
In order to analyze the effect of a legal rule's uncertain application on a 
firm's incentive to comply with that rule, make three assumptions: (i) The 
summary statistic for compliance is the amount the firm invests in safety 
research, where y is how much firm i invests and y* is the optimal 
amount; (ii) There is a positive probability that a firm will be held negli? 
gent if it spends y>y*> and a positive probability that it will be held non- 
negligent if it spends y<y*; the size of the variance around y* is a mea? 
sure of the uncertainty a firm faces due to courts' inability always to 
identify the due care standard accurately; (iii) The likelihood that a firm 
will be found liable varies inversely with y, so that overcompliance can 
reduce the likelihood of being found liable.98 
Given these assumptions, a firm's compliance incentive is a function of 
two factors: the size of the variance, or the degree of uncertainty, and the 
expected cost of damages if the firm takes slightly less or slightly more 
98. The analysis above respecting uncertainty and noncompliance draws heavily from Calfee & 
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 
(1984); Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Organiza? 
tion 279 (1986); H. Johnson, J. Kolstad & T. Ulen, Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability: 
Substitute or Complement? (1987) (unpublished manuscript). The textual argument may be clarified 
by a picture: 
The horizontal axis is the amount the firm invests in safety research; the vertical axis represents the 
various probabilities that a firm will be held liable when it spends particular amounts. The dashed 
line distribution represents substantially greater uncertainty for a firm?the variance is greater?than 
the solid line distribution. For example, a move to the right?more compliance?would reduce the 
likelihood of being found liable by less were the dashed distribution to describe the firm's view of its 
prospects than were the solid line distribution to describe these prospects. Analysts in this literature 
make two further assumptions: (iv) the probability density function is single peaked and symmet- 
ric?these requirements are satisfied by the bell-shaped normal distributions drawn in the figure; (v) 
firms are centered at the optimal level y*?that is, they believe courts are able to locate the correct 
due care standard but in actual cases can overshoot, or undershoot, the mark. 
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care than required by the due care standard. Two offsetting effects are 
relevant to the first factor. First, any uncertainty in application of a legal 
standard creates an incentive for undercompliance, for when the prob? 
ability of a sanction being applied for bad behavior is less than one, there 
is a tendency to disobey. Second, the likelihood of being found liable varies 
inversely with the amount of care taken. When there is relatively little 
uncertainty in the application of the legal rule, so that even a little 
overcompliance greatly reduces the probability of adverse judgments, the 
latter effect dominates the former. But when there is substantial uncer? 
tainty, such that a little overcompliance will not affect the likelihood of 
liability significantly, the former effect dominates. 
To consider the second factor, one should note that the costs to a firm of 
doing research into safety are not affected by the amount of accident costs 
that research avoids; research costs are just inputs to the firm that are 
purchased in markets. If research costs are held constant, then, the larger 
the expected accident costs when a firm's investment in safety is close to 
the due care standard, the more valuable to a firm will be small reduc? 
tions in the probability of being found liable; hence, the greater will be the 
firm's incentive to do research?to appear to comply?so as to reduce this 
probability. Therefore, overcompliance should occur when expected acci? 
dent costs are high. 
Using these factors to generate predictions in actual cases is an uncer? 
tain enterprise because there is no obvious way to know when a variance 
is "large" or expected accident costs are "high" relative to the firm's other 
decision variables. Speculation suggests that in the design area overcom? 
pliance is more likely than undercompliance. Consider the manufacture of 
automobiles. The current set of probably useful safety improvements for 
cars appears small?airbags and shock absorbing bumpers, for exam? 
ple?and the costs of safety research are relatively well known. Thus, in a 
suit against a car maker for failing to use a subsequently perfected device, 
the trier of fact probably could reconstruct the optimal research program 
with a rough degree of accuracy. The variance, or degree of uncertainty, 
firms face thus seems small, which should incline firms to invest exces- 
sively in safety research. High accident costs also push firms in the direc? 
tion of overcompliance. When a design, rather than a single item, is found 
defective, expected liability costs are likely to be high, for every item pro? 
duced may lead to a lawsuit. To the extent that cars are paradigmatic, 
then, firms will overcomply with a rule holding them liable only if they 
failed to research safety optimally. In contrast to the negligence standard 
just examined, the absolute liability rule punishes firms whenever a useful 
safety device is invented subsequent to manufacture. Since liability costs 
for design defects can be quite high, the absolute liability rule would cre? 
ate substantial uncertainty costs and result in serious insurability 
problems. 
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To summarize this analysis of case (c), the manufacturer should be 
strictly liable for failing to make cars with magic metal only if the exis? 
tence of the metal would have been revealed by an optimal safety research 
program. Such a result will create either correct or excessive incentives for 
firms to do research; either outcome is acceptable. It also has relatively 
low uncertainty costs. The current state-of-the-art rule probably produces 
insufficient safety incentives, while an absolute liability rule generates ex? 
cessive uncertainty costs. 
Case (d) is case (b) with multiple actors: The Golf lacked the magic 
metal, though the firm knew of it, but the consumer was injured when her 
car shot off an insufficiently banked curve. If the consumer was nonnegli- 
gent, she should not bear the loss because she is presumably uninformed 
and both injurers, the firm and the relevant county, could reduce the like? 
lihood of such losses by warning or redesign. Under current law, the 
plaintiff could sue either injurer and collect her full loss from one of them, 
or could request that the loss be apportioned between the two injurers. 
Whether a particular injurer who is sued for the full loss can collect any 
part of the judgment from the other is a difficult legal question. There 
was no contribution among joint tortfeasors at common law, but this rule 
has been altered by statute in most states. Courts today vary in allowing 
an injurer to obtain contribution (or indemnity) under these statutes.99 
The appropriate rule for apportioning the loss would be to assess the 
injurers on a comparative basis. One should realize that the county re? 
sponsible for roads in this illustration is subject to a negligence rule. 
Under the strict liability contributory negligence solution proposed above, 
the manufacturer has an incentive to invest in safety until the marginal 
cost of doing so equals the marginal gain?which the firm will likely cal? 
culate not as benefits to consumers but as the reduction in its expected 
accident costs resulting from additional expenditures on safety. A court 
can treat the failure of a firm to optimize safety according to this rule as 
negligence, in the spirit of the Learned Hand test, because it can retrieve 
the variables the firm used in its calculations. Since both actors in this 
illustration can be subject to a negligence rule and comparative negligence 
is efficient,100 a satisfactory rule would allow the consumer to sue either 
the county or Volkswagen, with comparative negligence governing any 
claim between the nonconsumer parties. 
The proposed solution of strict liability for all design harms, with con? 
tributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses, would replace cur- 
99. For a description of the law of contribution and indemnity, see W. Prosser & W. Keeton, 
supra note 1, ?? 50-51. Compare Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978) (allowed contribution) with General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977) (refused contribution). 
100. See authorities cited supra note 80; Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An 
Economic Analysis, 9 J. Legal Stud. 517 (1980). 
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rent efforts to specify the firm's quality obligation through adjudication 
with a rule that holds a firm liable whenever its design causes harm. This 
new rule seems faithful to the law's safety and compensation goals, re? 
solves most cases relatively easily, and should make the law less arbitrary 
in its application. 
B. Damage Issues 
1. Pecuniary Loss 
The consumer sovereignty norm offers two justifications for holding 
firms strictly liable for consumers' pecuniary losses. First, well-informed 
consumers would insure fully against these losses, as shown in Section I- 
B-l, but consumers who underestimate the risk that losses will be in- 
curred will not do so. Consequently, strict liability for pecuniary harm 
only requires firms to supply an insurance term that the firms would have 
supplied had the market been working well. 
Second, strict liability for pecuniary loss creates appropriate incentives 
for safety. Courts cannot decide themselves how products should be made, 
as Sections II-C and III-A showed, but they can impose strict liability for 
pecuniary harm. This is the correct solution because such liability induces 
firms to make all safety investments whose cost fails below consumers' 
willingness to pay. To see why, recall that pecuniary losses are "replacea- 
ble": A $500 wage loss is fully replaced by an insurance award of $500. 
When losses are replaceable, the value people attach ex ante to the pros? 
pect of being injured is solely a function of the monetary cost of the loss 
and the probability of incurring it. This value is not affected by a con- 
sumer's income level.101 This fact is important because, when safety im? 
provements are at issue, the consumer's choice is not between a dangerous 
or safe product, but between products that are relatively safe and rela? 
tively less so. The informed consumer asks: How much are marginal re? 
ductions in the probability of harm worth? Because consumers value pe? 
cuniary losses at their full monetary magnitudes, they value all such 
marginal reductions in the probability of harm equally: A consumer will 
pay up to $10 for a one percent reduction in the probability of an ex? 
pected $1,000 pecuniary loss, whether the reduction is made from a 
probability of harm level of .5 or of .1. Therefore, to hold a firm strictly 
liable for the full $1,000 loss will create the correct incentives for safety 
(as long as the firm can predict accident costs accurately). The firm will 
make all marginal reductions in the probability of harm that cost less than 
$10, and will charge the consumer for the expected value of the remaining 
risks. This is the appropriate insurance premium. The traditional belief 
101. Section III-B-2 discusses the complexities that arise when the value people place on losses is 
a function of their income, as is the case with nonpecuniary harms. 
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that strict liability simultaneously serves the law's compensation and 
safety goals thus seems borne out by modern theory, at least with respect 
to pecuniary harms.102 
This conclusion is complicated, however, because the problems of moral 
hazard,103 adverse selection and cross-subsidization that accompany manu? 
facturer- supplied insurance make strict liability seem less desirable.104 In? 
surance companies respond to moral hazard and adverse selection in sev? 
eral ways. First, they sell policies with deductibles. A deductible imposes 
part of a loss on the insured, thereby creating an incentive for the insured 
to exercise caution. This reduces the moral hazard problem. Deductibles 
also reduce the adverse selection problem. A purchaser who agrees to a 
large deductible is telling her insurance company, in a credible way, that 
she believes she is unlikely to incur frequent losses. The insurance com? 
pany then is more willing to insure her because it can plausibly believe 
she is a low risk. Similarly, the common practice of purchasing income 
maintenance coverage for a period substantially shorter than a person's 
working life both creates an incentive for an insured not to malinger and 
signals insurance companies that the insured prefers work to subsidized 
leisure. Hence, the purchase of limited coverage responds to moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Finally, insurance companies can key 
rates to observable traits of insureds that correlate negatively with the 
making of claims.105 
Requiring manufacturers to supply insurance through strict liability is 
problematic, because third party insurance responds poorly to moral haz? 
ard and adverse selection problems. Manufacturers who are compelled to 
sell insurance do not bargain with consumers, or even know who they are, 
and so cannot sell deductibles or otherwise tailor loss coverage to individ? 
ual consumer wants or traits. Rather, they must sell the same "full protec? 
tion" policy to every purchaser. The cost to consumers of insuring with 
manufacturers thus is higher than the cost of insuring with insurance 
companies. 
The third party insurance that strict liability compels also produces 
cross-subsidization. For example, suppose that person A earns $1,000 a 
month and would like to purchase coverage against a product-caused loss 
102. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
103. A moral hazard problem arises because an insured sometimes can influence the probability 
of an accident by taking care, but exercising caution is costly. After insurance is purchased, the in? 
sured derives no pecuniary benefit from care. He is fully covered whether he is careful or not and 
therefore may be careless. 
104. Much of the following analysis derives from Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and 
Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987), and Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance 
Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985). 
105. For example, companies charge lower rates to safe drivers. If insurance companies are pre? 
cluded from using deductibles, limiting coverage, or keying rates to observable claim related factors, 
they will face serious moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Their response to these problems 
is predictable: They will refuse to sell coverage or raise rates. 
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of one year's income, the probability of which is .01. The risk to this 
person, and hence his premium, is $120 per year. Person B buys the same 
product and also wants one year's coverage, but she earns $2,000 a 
month. Hence, her risk and premium is $240. A private insurance com? 
pany would sell policies to these two people and collect a premium of 
$360, $120 from A and $240 from B. A manufacturer, given these facts, 
also would collect a total premium of $360 but, because it could not dis? 
tinguish A from 5, would charge each of them $180 by adding this 
amount to the product price. As a consequence, person A pays an amount 
equal to the cost of serving him, $120, plus a subsidy of $60, so that 
person B can buy insurance for $60 less than the social cost of serving her. 
Since A earns less than 5, and thus is likely to be poorer, the cross- 
subsidization seems inequitable; it redistributes wealth from the poor to 
the rich. It is also inefficient, since B is offered a product at less than its 
social cost, while A is offered a product at more than its social cost. Be? 
cause private first party insurance has equity and efficiency advantages 
over third party insurance, strict liability, which requires firms to bear the 
pecuniary loss risk as third party insurers, seems misconceived. 
These arguments do not overcome the case for strict liability when the 
full implications of consumer risk misperceptions are considered. If firms 
disclaimed liability for pecuniary loss, optimistic consumers might buy an 
insufficient amount of first party insurance. The insurance they did buy 
would cover the vicissitudes of life: losses from product defects, accidents 
in the home, and criminal assault. The premium would reflect all of these 
causes but would not identify their separate contributions. Therefore, con? 
sumers could not know the value of product risks by observing either the 
insurance or the product prices quoted to them. Instead, in making 
purchases they would simply infer this value from what they generally 
know. By assumption, their inferences would be incorrect. Consequently, 
consumers might buy too many unsafe products and consumer demand 
would not give firms the appropriate incentives to invest in safety. The 
costs of freedom of contract, in the form of undercompensation and possi? 
bly reduced deterrence, thus could exceed the gains, in the form of more 
efficient insurance policies. 
In addition, a sensible strict liability system does not ignore moral haz? 
ard and adverse selection concerns. If the law were to enforce a contribu? 
tory negligence defense, consumers would face incentives to take care that 
would counterbalance the disincentives created by third party insurance. 
Thus, when consumers are imperfectly informed, the claim that the defi- 
ciencies of third party insurance justify abandoning strict liability is 
unpersuasive.106 
106. Also, the advantages of first party insurance markets should not be overstated. Group insur? 
ance, which covers many persons, involves little experience rating and so produces nontrivial moral 
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Nonetheless, the deficiencies of third party insurance through strict lia? 
bility are troubling. They could be partially avoided, and the advantages 
of strict liability retained, by adopting a rule that requires firms whose 
products could cause harm to quote two prices to consumers?a "full" 
price that includes the cost of insurance, and a "reduced" price that ex- 
cludes this cost. Under the proposed rule, a consumer who paid the "full" 
price would be entitled to sue the firm in strict liability for pecuniary loss. 
A consumer who paid the "reduced" price would not. The consumer, 
however, could not obtain a "reduced" price unless he gave the seller a 
certificate, obtained from the consumer's insurance company, establishing 
that the consumer was insured against pecuniary harm.107 
This reform would have two advantages. First, it would create in? 
creased awareness of product risks. A consumer who was not insured 
would know how much the product's price was increased by a strict liabil? 
ity insurance policy. An insured consumer would know substantially more 
about how dangerous products are. Because consumers would be better 
informed, firms would face more accurate demand curves and so be more 
likely to invest optimally in safety. Second, the scheme would permit con? 
sumers to benefit from the efficiencies and equities of first party insur? 
ance; consumers could opt out of strict liability upon proof that they were 
privately insured. 
This solution is not fanciful. Existing markets sometimes provide two 
price schemes, in the form of standard warranties and optional extended 
service contracts.108 Nevertheless, the solution may have serious shortcom- 
ings. One concern is that bad risks may find it difficult to purchase pri? 
vate insurance. If so, an adverse selection problem will be created that 
could greatly increase product prices or render the proposed solution un- 
workable. The adverse selection problem may also distort the strict liabil? 
ity price signal. If only bad risks "insure" with manufacturers, the good 
risks who opt out will see a price difference between a product with strict 
liability and a product without it that reflects the high extreme and not 
hazard and adverse selection problems. See Feldman, Health Insurance in the United States: Is Mar? 
ket Failure Avoidable?, 54 J. Risk & Ins. 298 (1987). 
107. The logic of this reform implies that consumers also should be able to opt out of strict 
liability if they are self-insured, but it seems unwise to allow consumers to do so. The reform's effect 
would be vitiated if simple declarations by consumers that they were self-insured were given legal 
effect, for consumers would be tempted to lie to get lower prices. Thus, the law should require evi? 
dence of self-insurance. When self-insurance is claimed, the only credible evidence would be personal 
financial records. Insisting on such evidence is objectionable for two reasons: it is not easy 10 specify 
what records would suffice, and privacy values could be contravened if people had to reveal substan? 
tial personal data just to make purchases. It thus seems preferable to require proof of market insur? 
ance. This issue seems unimportant, however, because consumers who are affluent enough to self- 
insure commonly also purchase market insurance against risks to life and health. 
108. The solution is related to the idea that it is appropriate to use the amount for which a person 
insured herself when buying general accident insurance as the sum that would compensate her for 
tortious harm. See Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems For Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. 
Rev. 771, 810-19 (1982). 
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the mean risk of harm. The good risks then may believe that the product 
is more dangerous than it actually is, and so purchase less of it than they 
should, creating excessive incentives for firms to invest in safety. 
Another problem arises from the reform's purpose of ensuring that the 
compensation goal is adequately pursued. Given this purpose, how much 
private insurance must a consumer have to opt out of strict liability? Be? 
cause consumers and possible insurance packages are diverse, this ques? 
tion may be difficult to answer. Finally, developing and policing a certifi? 
cate opting-out scheme is a complex activity. All of these difficulties may 
be resolvable, but they obviously imply that the scheme requires further 
study. This study should be undertaken because the scheme could help 
resolve a problem?that given the nature of insurance markets, strict lia? 
bility is too expensive?which has never been successfully addressed. 
2. Nonpecuniary Loss 
Strict liability for nonpecuniary harm is questionable even if imperfect 
information is assumed, because strict liability requires consumers to 
purchase more insurance and more safety than their better informed selves 
would want. The former defect is discussed in Section I-B-l. The latter 
defect exists because the willingness to pay problem introduced in Section 
I-B-2 is difficult to solve when nonpecuniary harm is at issue. Nonpecu? 
niary harms are not replaceable by insurance payments or damage judg? 
ments; rather, these transfers are used to purchase substitutes that make 
up for or assuage the pain of accidents.109 Because substitutes rather than 
replacements are at issue, the value people attach to the risk of incurring 
nonpecuniary harm is a function of people's income. This follows from 
the diminishing marginal utility of money theory, which holds that a poor 
person would miss the marginal dollars required to purchase substitutes 
more than a rich person, and so the former would pay more to avoid 
having to purchase substitutes?that is, pay more to reduce the risk of 
harm. An important implication of this analysis is that risk values are a 
function of risk levels themselves. This is because risks are current costs to 
people; consequently, people are poorer when they face high risks than 
when they face low risks. Therefore, people will pay more to reduce the 
odds of harm when risks are high. Since current strict liability law re? 
quires full compensation for harm, regardless of the risk level, it is insen? 
sitive to variations in people's willingness to pay and so induces firms to 
invest excessively in safety. 
An illustration will clarify this point. Let a firm make a product that is 
defective .1 of the time and causes only nonpecuniary harm. The firm 
could reduce the probability of harm in .01 increments at a successive cost 
109. See supra Section I-B-l. 
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of $10 for the first reduction, $11 for the second, $12 for the third, and so 
forth. If consumer X is injured, suppose, a jury would value her nonpecu? 
niary harm at $1,200, for which the firm would be strictly liable. If the 
firm anticipated this liability, it would reduce the product's propensity to 
injure by .03 and charge consumer X $33; each .01 reduction in the odds 
of incurring a $1,200 loss is worth $12 to the firm, so it will make all 
such reductions whose cost fails below or equals $12. Suppose, however, 
that consumer X values marginal losses from incurring nonpecuniary 
harm at $1,100 when the risk level is .1, $950 when it is .09, and so forth. 
These values for risk imply that consumer X would be willing to pay $11 
for the first .01 reduction in the probability of incurring nonpecuniary 
harm, $9.50 for the second .01 reduction, and less for the third.110 If con? 
sumer X's preferences should control, the firm should make only the first 
risk reduction, whose cost is less than consumer X is willing to spend on 
safety. Strict liability thus compels consumers to pay more for safety?$33 
in this illustration?than consumers believe safety is worth to them.111 
110. Recall that the value of a risk is the product of its likelihood and its cost. Thus, if a con? 
sumer attaches a value of $1,100 to nonpecuniary harm at a risk level of .10, she would pay up to .01 
times $1,100, or $11, for a .01 reduction in the probability of incurring the harm. 
111. This analysis may be further clarified by a diagram: 
The vertical axis represents the consumer's wealth, the horizontal axis the probability of harm. The 
line W{p) is an indifference curve, reflecting all wealth/probability combinations among which the 
consumer is indifferent. For example, the consumer is indifferent between having the wealth endow- 
ment W=A and facing the probability p = .9, and having the pair W=B; p ? .l. The curve rises to 
show that as the probability of an accident increases, the consumer needs more wealth to be indiffer? 
ent between higher and lower probabilities of harm. The curve also is convex, which means that the 
consumer is willing to give up less wealth for reductions in the probability of harm when that 
probability is low than when it is high. Convexity is implied by the diminishing marginal utility of 
money theory. The analytical conclusion that people value risks less when they are low has empirical 
support. A large British survey (n= 1,103 persons) found that people state that they will pay more to 
reduce risks when the probability of harm is high than when it is low. See Jones-Lee, Hammerton & 
Philips, The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 Econ. J. 49, 53-57 (1985) 
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Difficulties arise in implementing this analysis. A firm should be held 
liable for nonpecuniary harm if it fails to make safety improvements 
whose cost is below a consumer's willingness to pay, but the rate at which 
individuals will substitute money for risk varies. These individual margi? 
nal rates of substitution cannot easily be reconstructed ex post. A deci? 
sionmaker could determine mean rates of substitution?such as that the 
average person will pay $300 to move from p=.2 to p=.19 but only 
$8.00 to move from .03 to .02?by using survey research. Firms could be 
held liable if they failed to make the safety investments their own costs 
and these mean rates implied. A jury is unlikely to be able to act in this 
fashion, however, because litigants will not provide it with the requisite 
data. Courts also are reluctant to set intermediate levels for damage recov? 
eries. Hence, courts can either require full compensation for nonpecuniary 
harm, which juries perhaps can assess, or require no compensation at all. 
The former choice produces excessive safety and excessive insurance. The 
latter probably produces insufficient safety, though the insurance level 
will be correct. There is no obvious choice between these options. 
This problem in setting appropriate nonpecuniary damage awards 
arises because the common law has too few policy instruments; courts can 
only award damages or deny them. Administrative intervention would 
provide another policy instrument. The state could exclude common law 
liability for pain and suffering losses, but impose tort fines on firms. 
Economists sometimes suggest this solution but have not considered how it 
would work for products liability.112 An agency, in theory at least, could 
ascertain mean consumer marginal rates of substitution between money 
and risk by survey research and then fine firms that failed to make the 
safety investments implied by these substitution rates and the firms' own 
costs. 
This reform has two virtues. First, the prospect of fines would create 
incentives for firms to invest in safety. Second, since the fines would be set 
by statute or regulation, manufacturers' exposure would be more predict? 
able. A weakness of this reform is that it forces unwanted insurance on 
consumers by causing higher prices. This effect could be mitigated by re- 
bating collected fines to consumer purchasers. Tort fines thus could 
achieve some accident cost reduction without imposing excessively sub- 
optimal contracts on consumers.113 This reform, like others suggested in 
(automobile safety). Similar survey results were obtained in Smith & Desvousges, An Empirical 
Analysis ofthe Economic Value of Risk Changes, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 89, 109-10 (1987) (hazardous 
wastes). 
112. Potential uses for tort fines are described in S. Shavell, supra note 2, at 233-35. The tort 
fine option perhaps was first noted by Calabresi. See G. Calabresi, supra note 41, at 119-28, 270 
n.5. The text discusses only pain and suffering, but the analysis also applies to other nonpecuniary 
harms such as mental distress. 
113. A cap on the recovery of nonpecuniary losses is frequently proposed. Some states have 
"capped" noneconomic loss generally, or, more commonly, limited the recovery of nonpecuniary dam? 
ages in medical malpractice actions. See supra note 1. A cap is a rough compromise between the 
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this Article, is proposed for serious study rather than advocated strongly. 
The administrative difficulties in implementing the reform are significant; 
creating a fine schedule and managing a rebate scheme are complex activi? 
ties.114 Nevertheless, the reform appears to be the best means of harmo- 
nizing the law's compensation and safety goals in the context of non? 
pecuniary loss. 
Courts cannot institute a system of tort fines, but nevertheless should 
deny strict liability for nonpecuniary harm for three reasons.115 First, de? 
nying liability will result in consumers purchasing the appropriate 
amount of insurance. Second, the risk of nonpecuniary harm is difficult 
for firms to predict and insure against. Consumers' ability to seek com? 
pensation for nonpecuniary harm also causes firms to contest lawsuits 
they might otherwise settle. Thus, the uncertainty and administrative costs 
of the tort system will be substantially lower if strict liability for this as? 
pect of harm is denied. Third, as shown in Section H-B-l, there is only 
weak evidence that consumer risk misperceptions actually justify strict lia? 
bility. For the reasons given there, uncertainty as to whether strict liabil? 
ity is necessary should be resolved by refraining from imposing the risk of 
incurring nonpecuniary harm on firms.116 The best solution is for courts 
to impose strict liability only for pecuniary harm and for legislatures to 
create a system of tort fines.117 
conflicting goals of accident cost reduction and provision of adequate compensation. The tort fine 
alternative is preferable because it approximately achieves these goals rather than partially sacrifices 
both of them, as caps do. 
114. There is no general method for estimating the value of changes in the probabilities of harm 
as a function of the attributes of a risky event. Thus, marginal rates of substitution may have to be 
discovered risk by risk, which would be a tedious process. See Smith, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Risk 
Assessment, 4 Advances in Applied Microeconomics, 19, 42-43 (1986). 
115. Denying tort recoveries for pain and suffering would have a significant impact. Recent data 
show that pain and suffering damages comprise from 30% to 57% of all awards in which payment for 
bodily injury is received, depending on the type of injury. Also, when any award for pain and suffer? 
ing is made, pain and suffering damages constitute approximately 67% of the total recovered. See W. 
Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious 
Awards (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
116. An additional, very speculative point is that the magnitude of pain and suffering losses may 
be endogenous to the liability system. To deny their recovery is to tell people that suffering is to be 
borne with courage and overcome. To permit recovery is to tell them that suffering is so awful that 
only large sums of money can assuage pain. There may be less suffering under the former legal 
regime, and the attitude it encourages may be more adaptive to life. Hence, the denial of recovery for 
pain and suffering losses may actually reduce their magnitude. The possible pernicious effect on peo? 
ple's attitudes that could be caused by the legal system's grant of monetary damages for pain and 
suffering apparently makes these damages objectionable on Marxist grounds as well. Richard Abel 
used a Marxist perspective to argue that damages for pain and suffering should be abolished because 
the awarding of them "commodifies" suffering, thereby reenforcing the bourgeois notion that all as? 
pects of experience are monetizable. In his words, "damages for intangible injury dehumanize, substi- 
tuting money for compassion, arousing jealousy rather than expressing sympathy, and contributing to 
a culture that views experience and love as commodities." Abel, A Critique of Tort Law, 8 Brit. J. 
Law & Soc. 199, 210 (1981); see also id. at 207. 
117. An objection to this conclusion deserves mention. Pain and suffering recoveries may be ar? 
gued to have no direct compensation or safety function, but instead to serve to require defendants to 
pay plaintiffs' legal fees. Allegedly, these payments advance the law's goals indirectly: The payment of 
plaintiffs' legal fees helps achieve the compensation goal. Although plaintiffs can recover all pecuniary 
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C. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are awarded in products liability cases to punish 
those who fail the risk/benefit test or violate the duty to warn.118 Under 
traditional tort law, such delicts would have to be egregious to justify a 
punitive damages award. This rule has been relaxed in recent years. Pu? 
nitive damage awards now are commonly sought in products liability cases 
and sometimes are granted for seemingly ordinary transgressions.119 
It is not necessary to relax the traditional rule to achieve safe prod? 
ucts.120 Design and warning liability under current law is a version of 
negligence. Firms are not liable unless their conduct fails below the legal 
standard. Liability in negligence has a peculiar feature: Firms that spend 
less on safety or warnings than the legal standard requires bear all acci? 
dent costs, while firms that spend the appropriate amount bear no losses. 
The legal sanction, that is, does not vary with the degree of undercomp? 
liance; firms are fully liable whether they undercomply by a dollar or by a 
million dollars. Consequently, firms never voluntarily undercomply by 
only a small amount. Firms can violate their design or warning obliga? 
tions accidentally or deliberately, but firms that deliberate will un- 
losses, they must pay lawyers; the pain and suffering damage component permits such payments while 
ensuring that full compensation is received. Also, that consumers can fully recover pecuniary losses 
induces them to sue when they otherwise would not. Consequently, firms are faced with all of the 
costs they cause. This latter argument presupposes that without recoveries for pain and suffering, the 
law would be underenforced. 
These justifications for the recovery of pain and suffering losses are unpersuasive. The common 
solution to the problem of undercompensation or underenforcement is to provide counsel fees to the 
winner in a law suit. There is no reason to suppose that the imprecise solution of a pain and suffering 
recovery is superior to an explicit statutory award of iegal fees. Moreover, because firms reflect antici- 
pated pain and suffering judgments in prices, consumers now are compelled to enter a "market" for 
prepaid legal services. Although markets for a few forms of prepaid legal services now exist, the 
apparent scarcity of such markets (when no impediments to the formation of these markets appear to 
exist) suggests that such a legally imposed market may contravene the consumer sovereignty norm. 
There also is no reason to suppose that products liability law would be underenforced if the incen? 
tive to sue is reduced in some cases. Current analysis holds that some tort rules may be underenforced 
and others overenforced under any fee system because there always is a divergence between the pri? 
vate gain and the social gain from bringing suit. Thus, the actual effect of a change in the availability 
of legal fees is difficult to predict. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly 
Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1988). 
118. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 
(1976) (design defect); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (duty 
to warn). 
119. See Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Lia? 
bility Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 14-38 (1985-86). Direct evidence from studies of jury verdicts in 
particular jurisdictions shows that while punitive damage awards generally are rising, "[t]he fre- 
quency of punitive awards in personal injury cases has changed little over the 25-year period of the 
study, although there has been some recent increase." The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND 
Corp. Punitive Damages . . . How Much and To Whom: A Summary of Research Results 
2 (1987). On the other hand, "[e]xtraordinarily large awards . . . have ballooned in size in all types 
of cases. ..." Id. at 3. Evidence similar to that of the RAND Study is reported in W. Landes & R. 
Posner, supra note 2, at 302-07. 
120. The analysis in this section draws heavily from Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Dam? 
ages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982); and Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive 
Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982). A helpful review of the cases is set out in Ausness, supra 
note 119. 
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dercomply by a lot because it is counterproductive to undercomply by a 
little. This analysis suggests that a manufacturer should be subject to pu? 
nitive damages only if it recklessly or willfully disregarded safety. To act 
in this fashion is to undercomply by a lot. If the evidence fails to show a 
disregard for safety and the manufacturer's design or warning choice is at 
all plausible, punitive damages are unnecessary.121 
Punitive damages are sometimes suggested as a response to under- 
enforcement of the law or to other forms of uncertainty in the law's appli? 
cation that may reduce a firm's incentive to behave lawfully.122 Yet it is 
difficult to justify punitive damages in products liability cases on these 
grounds. There is no reason to believe that products liability law generally 
is underenforced. Further, as Section III-A-3 showed, firms are often 
likely to respond to uncertainty in the application of laws by overcomply- 
ing. In these cases, the appropriate legal response is not to increase dam? 
ages but to reduce them. Since it is hard to determine precisely when 
overcompliance is a serious problem, the best rule is to restrict punitive 
damage awards to outrageous cases. 
IV. Conclusion: Reform and the Products Liability Crisis 
Modern products liability law substitutes tort regulation of defective 
product problems for the contract regulation of the past on the ground 
that consumers are imperfectly informed. This shift in the legal treatment 
of defective products is difficult to justify because the evidence that con? 
sumers misspecify risks in ways that disadvantage them is weak. Conse? 
quently, those who believe that private choice should be restrained only if 
good reasons have been established for doing so should strive to reverse 
the abandonment of contract for tort. Decisionmakers whose concern is to 
compensate victims unless there are good reasons for not doing so could 
justifiably reject this conclusion, since the evidence that consumers are 
well-informed is persuasive but not compelling. Even so, tort regulation of 
defective products could be much improved as measured against the con? 
tractual norm that the state should provide consumers with the sales con? 
tracts that they would choose if they were better informed. According to 
this norm, courts have made three major errors. First, they sometimes 
have responded to the presumed existence of imperfect information by di? 
rectly regulating product quality in design defect cases. This regulation is 
unworkable, and should be replaced by a rule that holds firms liable 
121. See Cooter, supra note 120, at 89-91. This argument assumes that the risk/benefit test 
continues to be used. If courts were to adopt the strict liability/contributory negligence solution urged 
in Section II-C for design defects, there would be little need for punitive damages to ensure legal 
compliance. 
122. See, e.g., Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 
1257, 1292-95 (1976) (punitive damages appropriate when manufacturer takes advantage of short- 
comings of legal system and makes it inordinately costly for victim to assert his legal rights). 
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whenever their products cause harm. Second, courts have relaxed consum? 
ers' obligation to take care in the mistaken belief that meeting this obliga? 
tion requires information that consumers lack. The law should restore 
consumers' obligation to be careful because consumers are competent to 
fulfill this obligation, and because holding firms liable unless consumers 
are careless will produce the degree of safety that well-informed consum? 
ers would prefer. Third, courts misconceive the relation between tort law's 
compensation and deterrence goals. Compensating consumers fully for pe? 
cuniary harm satisfies both of these goals, but compensating consumers for 
nonpecuniary harm does not; informed consumers choosing ex ante would 
refuse both the extra insurance and extra safety that strict liability for 
nonpecuniary harm now requires them to purchase. Hence, firms should 
be strictly liable only for pecuniary harm. 
These and other reforms suggested in this Article are meant to improve 
private law solutions to the defective products problem. It may be illumi? 
nating to explore how these reforms respond to the products liability "cri? 
sis" the current system is alleged to have caused. The "crisis" has two 
facets. First, high insurance rates or the refusal of insurers to write cover? 
age result in some products being withdrawn from the market, others not 
being introduced, and still others being sold at much increased prices.123 
Second, in some industries, such as drugs and chemicals, thousands of vic? 
tims sue one or a few manufacturers, thereby imposing large burdens on 
courts and defendants. It is implausible to suppose that products in gen? 
eral are becoming less safe.124 The current products liability doctrine for 
treating the accidents that do occur is among the other possible causes of 
the current crisis. 
The insurance problem is partly attributable to the uncertainty created 
by current law. Given current doctrine, it is difficult to anticipate liability. 
Courts also seem unpredictably to expand existing doctrines and create 
new ones. The law also allows high judgments, which makes suing ra? 
tional even when there is only a small chance that victims' harms resulted 
from violations of existing law. These suits increase the pressure on courts 
to change their doctrines, resulting in further uncertainty. 
The proposals made in this Article would alleviate the products liability 
crisis to the extent that it results from current doctrines and their applica? 
tion. The proposals would reduce uncertainty in application of the law by 
lessening the unpredictability of design defect litigation (Section IH-A), 
increasing consumers' obligation to comply with written warnings and in- 
123. See Priest, supra note 104, at 1521-24 (1987); Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence 
Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Crisis, 24 
San Diego L. Rev. 929 (1987). 
124. The data indicate that accident rates, including those from products, fail with increases in 
wealth, and so have declined in the last fifty years. See Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety 
Effects of Product Safety Regulation, 28 J.L. & Econ. 527, 531 (1985). 
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structions (Section III-A and B), and eliminating strict liability for nonpe? 
cuniary losses, substituting a system of tort fines (Section I and III-B-2). 
The proposals would allow consumers to opt out of strict liability for pe? 
cuniary harm if they are insured (Section III-B-1), and generally reduce 
the incentive of consumers to sue in doubtful cases. Finally, recognition 
that the case for strict liability is itself weak should help alleviate an im? 
portant cause of uncertainty: the penchant of courts to create new legal 
obligations that firms cannot escape through warnings or contracts.126 
Judges should recognize the imprudence of driving further along what 
may be the wrong road. 
125. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (man? 
ufacturer liable for harm regardless of whether product's danger was foreseeable at time of 
manufacture). 
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Appendix: An Analytic Discussion of Design Defect Liability 
Law and economics analysis considers two methods of regulating a 
firm's conduct: negligence and strict liability. Either is desirable when it 
would cause firms to maximize social welfare in connection with product 
use. The negligence rule, however, is inappropriate in the product design 
context. To see why, consider the typical way this rule is derived.126 Let 
H(q,x) be the expected monetary loss to a consumer from a product defect 
where q is output and x is the firm's care level. The firm's production 
costs are C=C(q,x) and the consumer derives benefits B(q) from use of 
the product. The social optimum is obtained by maximizing welfare 
W(qyx)=B(q)-H(qyx)-C(qyx) over output and the firm's care level. This 
equation assumes that expenditures on safety influence welfare only as 
subtractions from gross welfare, the B(q) term; consumer benefits from an 
activity are supposed to be independent of safety expenditures on that ac? 
tivity. This assumption is often innocuous but, as shown in Section II-C 
above, is not legitimate when applied to products because expenditures on 
product safety directly affect product benefits. 
When safety and product benefits are related, the standard methodol? 
ogy, which entails differentiating the welfare equation with respect to q 
and then x to solve for the first order conditions, is not appropriate. In the 
latter differentiation, the B(q) term is a constant and drops out, which 
implies that the appropriate level of investment in safety can be derived by 
considering only accident and accident avoidance costs. However, benefits 
must also be considered in the design defect context. Judges have re? 
sponded to this need by creating a different negligence rule, the risk/bene? 
fit test, which incorporates consumer benefits directly into the welfare cal- 
culation. Doing this, however, requires juries to do cost/benefit analyses, 
which they are ill-equipped to perform. This is therefore an undesirable 
solution. Strict liability with a contributory negligence defense is optimal. 
To establish this result, treat firms and consumers as if they are playing a 
simple dynamic game.127 A firm's strategy is to take care (C)?invest opti? 
mally in cost reduction?or to be negligent (N). A consumer has the same 
choice. Losses are L. A firm's cost of care is a where a* is optimal. A 
consumer's cost of care is b where b* is optimal when the firm takes care 
and bn* is optimal when it does not. Because what is optimal for consum? 
ers may depend on what is optimal for firms, b*<bn* is possible (con? 
sumers may have to be more careful when firms are careless). The 
probability that a product will be defective is p, with p* the probability if 
126. A good example is found in the important article, Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 
9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 10-11, 13 (1980). See also W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 2, at 278-80. 
127. The theory of dynamic games is helpfully reviewed in Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargaining 
Theory: An Introduction, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 709 (1986); Fudenberg & Tirole, Noncooperative 
Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview, in D. Schmalensee & 
R. Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization (forthcoming)). 
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the firm takes care: p>p*- If the firm is referred to as actor /, because it 
moves first by making the product, and the consumer is actor //, there are 
four accident probabilities: 
(i) 1(C); II(C)=p*-Ap* 
(ii) 1(C); II(N)=p* 
(iii) I(N); 11(C) =p-Ap 
(iv) I(N); II(N)=p. 
Consumer care is taken to be a reduction in the likelihood that a defect 
will cause harm (p*-Ap*, for example). Suppose it is optimal for both 
parties to take some care. Then optimality implies that a* + b* + (p*- 
Ap*)L<a + b+pLy and so forth. There are four payoffs to consider (the 
firm's pay off is given first): 
(i) 1(C); II(C)=a* + (p*-Ap*)L; b* 
(ii) 1(C); II(N) 
= 
(a*);p*L 
(iii) I(N); II(C)=a + (p-Ap)L; bn* 
(iv) I(N); II(N)=a; pL. 
These payoffs reflect the rule that is assumed to govern, that is, strict 
liability with contributory negligence. 
The game can be drawn as (with the firm's payoff on top): 
I 
(a* + (Ap*-Ap*)L a* (a+(p-Ap)L (a) 
(b*) (p*L) bn* (pL) 
Here, 1(C); 11(C) is the unique Nash equilibrium. To see why, let / play 
C. Then //, the consumer, will also play C. A consumer is contributorily 
negligent when she fails to take cost-justified steps to reduce accident 
costs; that is, // is negligent if Ap*L>b*. This implies that p*L>b*. 
Hence, a consumer will play C, thereby incurring b*<p*L. Next let / 
play N. By the same logic, bn*<pL so the consumer will play C also. 
When the consumer will play C whatever the firm does, the firm's best 
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response will be to play C if a* + (p*-Ap*)L<a+(p-Ap)L. The defini? 
tion of optimality above implies that a* + b* + (p*-Ap*)L<a + b* + (p- 
Ap)L. This implies that a* + (p*-Ap*)L<a + (p-Ap)L. Therefore, the 
firm will play C and the unique efficient equilibrium of 1(C); H(C) will 
obtain. 
This result is driven by the assumption that // knows what / does 
before // moves; it assumes, that is, that // is perfectly informed of the 
product's care level.128 If // does not know what / has done, redraw the 
figure omitting the payoffs (which are unchanged) but adding an informa? 
tion set. 
I 
Here, multiple equilibria are possible, some of which are inefficient. To 
see why, suppose that b*<bn*. Then let d be the probability the con? 
sumer assigns to the chance the firm was careful (played C). If d is high 
enough, the consumer will play b*. Where b*<bn*y the firm's best re? 
sponse to this move is to play N. A play of b* is contributory negligence 
given the firm's choice of N, so the firm that plays N incurs no accident 
costs, and it will then play N because a<a* + (p*-Ap*)L. Hence, this 
equilibrium is inefficient; each party's care is suboptimal. This is one ex? 
ample of how imperfect information?here, supposing a firm has taken 
care when it has not?can yield inefficient equilibria. 
These results can be avoided if the consumer can always shift losses to 
the firm by playing b*. If so, the firm's choice reduces to playing C and 
bearing a* + (p*-Ap*)L or playing N and bearing a + (p-Ap')L. With re? 
gard to Ap\ since the consumer is in fact behaving suboptimally, she 
128. Rea, supra note 80; Haddock & Curran, supra note 80; and Shavell, Torts in which Victim 
and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & Econ. 589 (1983), all assume that the actor who moves 
second knows what the first actor did. This assumption is often plausible but must be rejected when 
imperfect information as to product safety is supposed, because here the first move is to build a level 
of safety into the product. 
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reduces accident costs by Apy<Ap. It was shown above that a* + (p*- 
Ap*)L<a(p-Ap)L, so the firm's incentive to behave carefully is even 
stronger here. Consequently, the unique and efficient equilibrium in 
which both parties take care will obtain if contributory negligence is de? 
fined to mean that a consumer bears no losses only when he incurs b*, 
that is, acts as carefully as he should act if the product is safe.129 
This result could not obtain under a legal rule of strict liability with 
comparative negligence. The consumer above chooses b* or is careful, be? 
cause otherwise she would bear p*L, the full cost of the accident. Under a 
comparative negligence regime, the consumer bears a portion, call it r, of 
the loss, where r is zero if the consumer is careful and one if the firm is 
careful but she is not. Then in a design defect case, if the consumer's lack 
of care and the firm's due care is established, the consumer would bear 
p*L, and for the reasons given above, she will choose b* instead. But the 
firm's care cannot be established, in the design defect context, without 
using the risk/benefit test. Negligence is to fail this test. If the test is 
abandoned, there is no nonarbitrary way to choose a value for r after 
consumer negligence is established, since this value is a function of com? 
paring the parties' negligence. Either consumer negligence must bar re? 
covery altogether, in which event there is no comparative negligence rule, 
or the jury must pick random values for r. If that occurs, there again is no 
comparative negligence rule. Simply put, comparative negligence cannot 
coexist with strict liability. Since contributory negligence can and does 
lead to efficient outcomes, the strict liability with contributory negligence 
rule should be adopted. 
129. This proposed solution is consistent with Cooter's view that strict liability is preferable to 
negligence when it is more difficult to calculate due care levels than damages. This is a correct 
description of design defect litigation, especially if, as suggested here, pain and suffering recoveries are 
abolished. See Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984). It also is consistent 
with Margolis' recent argument that strict liability with contributory negligence is efficient when it is 
easier to ascertain whether consumers took care than whether producers took care. See Margolis, Two 
Definitions of Efficiency in Law and Economics, 16 J. Legal Stud. 471 (1987). 
